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Recent Cases
TRIAL BY JURY OF ELEVEN IN A FELONY PROSECUTION
State v. McGee'
James Edward McGee was charged with the slaying of Ida Mae Rooks
and was brought to trial before a twelve-citizen jury. Toward the end of
the second day of trial one of the jurors suffered a seizure and was unable
to continue. Defendant McGee wished to proceed with trial and, in com-
pliance with the court's direction, signed a memorandum waiving his right
to a jury of twelve citizens and consenting to the case being decided by a
jury of eleven. The waiver memorandum was also signed by the defense
attorney, the prosecutor, and the judge. The jury of eleven found McGee
guilty of second degree murder and he appealed on the ground, inter alia,
that a trial by jury of less than twelve citizens violated the Missouri Con-
stitution, which provides:
That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate; provided that .... in every criminal case any defendant
may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit
the trial of such case to the court, whose finding shall have the
force and effect of a verdict of a jury.2
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and construed this
constitutional provision to mean:
In every criminal case any defendant may... with the assent of the
court, waive a jury of twelve citizens and submit the trial of such
case to a jury consisting of less than twelve citizens.3
Since the United States Supreme Court held, in the case of Patton v.
United States,4 that the United States Constitution does not prevent the
defendant in a felony prosecution from waiving one juror, there has been
a definite trend in the decisions of the state courts to construe their state
constitutions as similarly allowing such a waiver.5 With McGee Missouri
has joined this trend.
The Missouri court relied heavily on Patton. Fundamental to the de-
cision in Patton was the idea that waiver of the entire jury and waiver of
one juror are in substance the same thing-waiver of personal privileges. 6
1. 447 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
3. 447 S.W.2d at 273.
4. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). This case is directly in point with the case being noted.
5. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 24 Cal. App. 2d 302, 74 P.2d 1070 (1938); cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 574 (1938); People v. Scudieri, 363 l. 84, 1 N.E.2d 225 (1936);
State v. Scott, 156 Kan. 11, 131 P.2d 664 (1942); Attorney Gen. ex -el. O'Hara v.
Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936); State v. Zabrocki, 194 Minn.
346, 260 N.W. 507 (1935); Ex parte Kortgaard, 66 N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438 (1936).
6. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). See also, Note, 43 U. Mo.
BuLL. L. SER. 46 (1931).
(528)
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Since Missouri allows waiver of the entire jury,7 the court reasoned that it
is permissible to waive one juror and have the case tried before a judge
and eleven jurors.8 This line of reasoning provoked a vigorous dissent,9
but the weight of authority dearly supports the majority interpretation. 10
Aside from state constitutional requirements, three basic arguments
have been forwarded to support the proposition that a defendant in a
felony prosecution has no right to waive trial by jury of twelve,1 ' thus
changing the numerical makeup of the common law fact finding body.12
First, it has been argued that trial by common law jury (twelve disinter-
ested citizens) is part of the "framework of government." 13 However, at
common law trial by jury was considered to be a personal privilege for the
protection of the defendant,' 4 and as such there is no sound reason to say
the defendant cannot waive it in its entirety or in part.15 This conclusion is
readily supportable when one considers that the right to a speedy trial,
the right to counsel, and the right against self-incrimination are all secured
by the Constitution, yet these can be waived by requesting a continuance,
by refusing counsel, or by voluntarily and knowingly signing a confession.
The second basic argument is that the court has no jurisdiction to
hear and render judgment in a criminal case in the absence of a complete
jury.16 However, most of the cases supporting this point involve the waiver
of an entire jury and were decided before it was held that the United
States Constitution does not prevent a waiver of the jury in a criminal
case.' 7 In Patton v. United States the Court expressly stated that the right
to trial by jury "is not jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right
upon the accused . "...,,18 To hold otherwise would mean that all sen-
tences entered upon a plea of guilty would arguably be void for want of
jurisdiction.
7. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a); Mo. R. Ciau. P. 26.01(b).
8. "We agree that complete waiver of a jury and consent to be tried by less
than twelve jurors in substance 'amount to the same thing.'" 447 S.W.2d at 273.
9. Judge Seiler refused to accept that both waivers were personal privileges
of the defendant. He argued that the fact that both are in substance the same thing
means they were both "foreign to the common law .... [But not that] they are in
substance the same beyond that limited respect." 447 S.W.2d at 277.
10. Cases cited note 5 supra.
11. Note, 48 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 46 (1931).
12. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Rassmussen v. United States, 197
U.S. 516 (1905). But cf. Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich.
504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936) where the Michigan court concluded that the number
of jurors at common law was ambiguous at best.
13. Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134 (4th Cir. 1928); Freeman v. United
States, 227 F. 732 (2d Cir. 1915); Note, 43 U. Mo. BULL. L. SE. 46, 47 (1931).
14. 3 W. BLACKSTONE'S CoMmENTAILRs* 379; 2 J. STORY, CoMmENTAIES ON THE
CONSrTUTION § 1779 (3d.ed. 1858).
15. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
16. Note, 48 U. Mo. BULL. L. S-R. 46, 47 (1931).
17. See, e.g., Low v. United States, 169 F. 86 (6th Cir. 1909); Commonwealth
v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 158 N.E. 537 (1926); State v. Sanders, 243 S.W. 771 (Mo.
1922); State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 (1867); Territory v. Ah Wah & Ah Yen, 4
Mont. 149, 1 P. 732, 47 Am. Rep. 341 (1881).
18. 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930). Accord, People v. Clark, 24 Cal. App.2d 802, 74
P.2d 1070 (1938); People v. Scudieri, 363 Ill. 84, 1 N.E.2d 225 (1936); Attorney
Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936) ; Ex parte
Kortgaard, 66 N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438 (1936).
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Finally, it has been argued that the public interest in the life and
liberty of a citizen accused of a crime must be protected against infringe-
ment by ensuring that sentencing may only follow a jury verdict.1 9 How-
ever, this argument is weakened by the fact that a defendant has the right
to plead guilty and accept the sentence of the, judge. In the face of such
a public interest this practice of accepting guilty pleas could not be sup-
ported, inasmuch as the defendant could falsely plead guilty and thus
wrongfully infringe upon the interest of society.20
Based on the above discussion, it would appear that Missouri has
reached a sound result in McGee. However, a careful reading of the Mis-
souri Constitution suggests that, as a matter of constitutional interpretation,
the decision may be open to question. Neither the Missouri constitutions
of 1820,21 1865,22 nor 187523 provided that a defendant could waive a
trial by jury and consent to trial before a judge alone. Therefore, when in
1867 the question of waiver of one juror was first presented, the court re-
fused to condone such a procedure,24 stating that the "right to be tried
by a jury of twelve men is not a mere privilege; it is a positive requirement
of the law."25
However, in 1945 this constitutional provision was changed to provide
for waiver of the right to a jury trial in a criminal case. Although the word-
ing, "[tJhat the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate ... ,"2 was retained, 27 the 1945 provision also provided:
That in every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of
the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of such case to the
court, whose finding shall have the force and effect of a verdict
of a jury.28
Since a defendant may now waive the entire jury in a criminal case
it would appear that the right to trial by jury is no longer a "positive
requirement of the law," as stated in Mansfield,29 but is a personal priv-
ilege which may be waived.3 0 The Missouri Court in McGee agreed with
19. Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858); Note, 43 U. Mo. BuLL. L. S.R.
46, 47 (1931).
20. State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N.W. 275 (1879); Attorney Gen. ex rel.
O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936); Ex parte Kortgaard,
66 N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438 (1936).
21. Mo. CONsT. art. XIII, § 8 (1820) provided: "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate."
22. Mo. CONsT. art I, § XVII (1865) provided: "That the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate."
23. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1875) provided inpart:
The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate,
but a jury for the trial of criminal or civil cases in courts not of record, may
consist of less than twelve men as may be prescribed by law.
24. State v. Sanders, 243 S.W. 771 (Mo. 1922); State v. Meyers, 68 Mo. 266
(1878); State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 (1867) .
25. State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470, 478 (1867).
26. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a).
27. This wording first appeared in the Constitution of 1875. See note 23 supra.
28. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
29. 41 Mo. 470 at 478.
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the United States Supreme Court that the waiver of an entire jury is, in
substance, the same as the waiver of one juror,3 ' and it follows that the
latter is also a personal privilege and its waiver is not prohibited by the
Missouri Constitution.
However, it must be noted that this line of reasoning ignores the fact
that the 1945 Constitution expressly states "[t]hat the right to trial by jury
as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate .... -"32 It can be argued that
the meaning of the entire constitutional provision is dependent upon this
initial provision. Therefore, the right to trial by jury is to remain as it
existed before the adoption of the 1945 Constitution and the only deviations
which will be tolerated are those which are expressly stated.3 3 Accordingly,
the defendant could not waive one juror and consent to a jury of lesser
number than twelve because this was not allowed prior to 1945,34 and
the 1945 Constitution does not expressly permit such a waiver. The majority
opinion in McGee completely ignores this line of argument.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect that a future case with sim-
ilar facts would be decided differently. This leaves unanswered, however,
the question of how far the decision in McGee will be extended. In this
connection there are at least three problems to which McGee provides no
solution. First, the holding of the court is to the effect that the defendant
may, with the assent of the court, "submit the trial of such case to a jury
consisting of less than twelve citizens." 35 The question left unanswered is
how many less than twelve? Can the defendant waive more than one juror,
thus consenting to trial before a jury of nine, or five, or even two? Though
it was asserted by the dissenting opinion in McGee that the reasoning of
the majority would permit such an occurrence, the Missouri Constitution,3 6
the Missouri Rules of Court,37 and the majority holding all require that
the trial judge consent to any waiver regarding the jury. Accordingly, it is
doubtful if the sham of a two-member, or even a ten-member, jury will ever
occur since it is improbable that a trial judge will allow such a substantial
deviation from the established number of twelve jurors.
The second question raised by this decision is whether the defendant
can waive the numerical size of the jury at any time and under any cir-
cumstances? Though there is no express answer in McGee, the defendant
is arguably limited as to when he can waive one juror by the facts in this
case. Based on this assumption, waiver of a juror would be allowed only
after a twelve-citizen jury had been empaneled, the trial had commenced,
and one juror became so incapacitated as to be unable to continue.
The final problem raised is as to what occurs if the prosecution objects
to a proposed juror waiver and insists upon the case being heard by a twelve
member jury? Following the reasoning of the court in McGee, which is
31. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
32. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) (emphasis added).
33. State v. McGee, 447 S.W.2d 270 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
34. State v. Sanders, 243 S.W. 771 (Mo. 1922); State v. Meyers, 68 Mo. 266(1878); State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 (1867).
35. 447 S.W.2d at 273.
86. Art. I, § 22 (a).
37. Mo. R. CRmr. P. 26.01(b).
1970]
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based on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Patton, it
would appear that the right to waive a twelve member jury is a right in-
herent to the defendant and the prosecution would have no standing to
object. But, in Singer v. United States3 8 the Supreme Court backed away
from the rationale in Patton and rejected the contention that the defendant
had a right to insist on the waiver of the entire jury in the face of the
prosecution's objection. The Court went so far as to say:
A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of
trial is to an impartial trial by jury. We find no constitutional im-
pediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on the consent
of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either re-
fuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to
an impartial trial by jury .... 9
However, the Missouri Constitution expressly grants the defendant an addi-
tional constitutional right, i.e. the right to waive, with the judge's consent,
the entire jury.4 0 The constitution makes no reference to the necessity of
the prosecution's consent.4 1 Therefore, the Missouri Constitution expands
the constitutional right of the defendant as regards trial by jury, and,
arguably, allows the defendant to thwart the prosecution's insistence on
a twelve citizen jury. But if the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion,
does not consent to the waiver, then "[t]he accused has no absolute right,
either by constitution, statute, or court rule, to elect that he shall be tried
by the court without a jury. 4 2
In conclusion, it appears that Missouri has reached a practical result,
supported by the weight of authority, 43 but weak in its constitutional justi-
fication. The decision will have the effect of avoiding delay in reaching ju-
dicial disposition of a case where a juror is suddenly unable to complete
his task and the defendant is willing to continue. The decision is also
sound in that it binds the defendant to either one course or the other.
No longer can the defendant waive one juror, proceed to trial, and, if con-
victed, assert that the conviction should be reversed because of a defective
88. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
39. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
40. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22 (a).
41. Though the necessity of the prosecution's consent to waiver of the full
jury was not in issue, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the waiver is sufficient
as against the defendant's later challenge if it is in the form of a memorandum,
signed by the defendant and the defense attorney and approved by the trial
judge. State v. Butler, 415 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1967). No reference was made to the
necessity of the prosecution's consent.
42. State v. Taylor, 391 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Mo. 1965). The court left it to the
trial judge's discretion to protect the rights of society which are involved in a jury
trial.
43. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Clark, 24
Cal. App. 2d 302, 74 P.2d 1070, cert. denied, 304 U.S. 574 (1938); People v. Scudieri,
363 Ill. 84, 1 N.E.2d 225 (1936); State v. Scott, 156 Kan. 11, 131 P.2d 664 (1942);
Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936);
State v. Zabrocki, 194 Minn. 346, 260 N.W. 507 (1935); Ex parte Kortgaard, 66
N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438 (1936).
[Vol. 85
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jury.44 Moreover, McGee makes a further inroad into defining the personal
rights of one accused of a crime. It would now appear clear that in Mis-
souri the right to trial by jury is a personal privilege of the defendant over
which he, with the assent of the judge, has complete control.
WILLIAm A. ATtiNsON
PROHIBITION-TO PREVENT DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS
State ex rel. Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Dowd.'
In an action for damages for wrongful death, plaintiff served a set of
105 interrogatories on the defendant railroad company, which the defend-
ant claimed required a total of 227 separate answers. Defendant filed a
general objection, and in the alternative, objected specifically to 86 of the
interrogatories. The trial court overruled the general objection, but sus-
tained the specific objections to 21 of the interrogatories and one part of
another, indicating its intention to overrule the specific objections to 64
others.2 Defendant brought an action in prohibition to restrain the re-
44. In prior Missouri cases the conviction had been overturned in a situation
exactly like McGee. The reason given was that an eleven-member jury is defective.
See State v. Sanders, 243 S.W. 771 (Mo. 1922); State v. Meyers, 68 Mo. 266 (1878);
State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 (1867), all of which were overruled by the principal
case.
1. 448 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. Mo. R. Cv. P. 56.01 provides:
(a) Any party may serve upon any party written interrogatories to be
answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer or agent, who
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Interrogatories
may be served after commencement of the action and the service of ap-
pearance or service of process on the party to be interrogated without
leave of court, except that, if service is made by the plaintiff within 10
days after such commencement, leave of court granted with or without
notice must first be obtained, and except that a plaintiff may be inter-
rogated without service of process. The interrogatories shall be answered
separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories
have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting
the interrogatories within 15 days after the service of the interrogatories,
unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges
or shortens the time. Within 10 days after service of interrogatories under
this Rule a party may serve specific written objections to particular inter-
rogatories together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest
practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to which such objection is
made shall be deferred until the objections are determined.
Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into
under Rule 57, and the answers may be used to the same extent as pro-
vided in Rule 57 for the use of the deposition of a party. Interrogatories
may require as a part of or with the answers copies of all statements
concerning the action or its subject matter previously given by the inter-
1970]
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spondent judge from ordering it to answer 42 of the interrogatories.3
In refusing to issue the writ, the Missouri Supreme Court, en banc,
held that the trial court had not exceeded its jurisdiction in its ruling on
either the general or specific objections. As to the general objection, the
court asserted that such a large number of interrogatories was not per se
oppressive or an abuse of interrogatory practice, and that the determination
of oppressiveness was a matter for the trial court. The court added that
"fi]t would be a rare case where an appellate court would be justified in
prohibiting the trial judge who had refused to strike an entire set of inter-
rogatories."4
Upon examination of the trial court's ruling on the specific objections,
the court found that a reasonable argument could be advanced that the in-
terrogatories were reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible
rogating party, or copies of such documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, or photographs, not privileged, as are relevant to the answers
required, unless opportunity for their examination and copying be af-
forded. Interrogatories may be served after a deposition has been taken, and
a deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been answered, but
the court, on motion of the deponent or the party interrogated, may
make such protective orders as justice may require. The number of inter-
rogatories or sets of interrogatories to be serVed is not limited except asjustice requires to protect the party from annoyance, undue expense, em-
barrassment, or oppression. The provisions of Rule 57.01(c) are applicable
for the protection of the party from whom answers to interrogatories are
sought under this rule.(b) The party serving written interrogatories upon a public or private
corporation, or a partnership or association may designate the officer,director, general manager thereof, by name or description; and in case of
the refusal of any such person to make discovery, the court in its discretion
may apply the penalties of Rule 61.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01, as pertaining to Rule 56.01 states:(b) Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by this Rule,
the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to
the claim or defense or any other party, including the existence, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons havingknowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testi-
mony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The
examining party may not inquire as to the contents or substance of state-
ments, written or oral, obtained from prospective witnesses by or on behalf
of another party. The production or inspection of any writing obtained
or prepared by the adverse party or co-party, his attorney, surety, in-demnitor, or agent, in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial(except a statement given by -the interrogating party) or of any writing
that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 60.01, the conclusions of an
expert, shall not be required.
8. §530.010, RSMo 1969 provides:
The remedy afforded by the writ of prohibition shall be granted to
prevent usurpation of judicial power, and in all cases where the same is
now applicable according to the principles of law.
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evidence. Furthermore, it did not appear from the record that the answers
would subject relator to unwarranted annoyance, expense or oppression.
With this reasonable basis behind the order, the court refused to find an
abuse of the trial court's discretion. The court stated:
Once we arrive at this evaluation of the trial judge's action, that is
an end of the matter so far as prohibiting him is concerned, because
it has been established over and over that prohibition will not lie
to control discretionary judicial action by a lower court.5
There can be no question but that a writ of prohibition is the proper
remedy to be invoked to restrain an inferior court from assuming juris-
diction where it has none,6 or from exceeding its jurisdiction by issuing an
order it has no power to issue.7 The writ is a direction to the lower court
commanding it to cease in the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no
legal claim,8 whether there is a complete lack of jurisdiction or an act in
excess of jurisdiction.9 These are commonly referred to as separate grounds
for issuance of the writ, but in principle there is little distinction between
the two. Each is an attempt by a court to take judicial action without
judicial power or authority for such action. 10 "It is because such tribunal er-
roneously determines its own jurisdiction that the writ is issued.""
As a general rule, prohibition, being an extraordinary writ, will not be
available where a party claiming it has an adequate remedy by ordinary
means.' 2 The writ does not take the place of demurrer, appeal or writ of
error.'3 Where discretion lies with the trial court, prohibition will not
issue to correct mere error in the exercise of this discretion; rather, there
must be an abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction for
the writ to be issued.' 4
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. State ex rel. McCarter v. Craig, 328 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. En Banc 1959);
State ex rel. Taylor v. Nangle, 360 Mo. 122, 128, 227 S.W.2d 655, 657 (En Banc
1950); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 161, 163, 107 S.W. 487, 491
(En Banc 1908); State ex rel. Kenamore v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425, 428, 56 S.W. 474,
476 (En Banc 1900); State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 466, 483, 54 S.W.
494, 498 (En Banc 1899).
7. State ex rel. Houser v. Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121, 127 (Spr. Mo. App.
1966); State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain, 501 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Spr. Mo. App.
1957).
8. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Tracy, 237 Mo. 109, 117, 140 S.W.
888, 891 (En Banc 1911); J. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REEMEDIEs § 763 (1874).
9. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Tracy, 237 Mo. 109, 118, 140 S.W.
888, 890 (En Banc 1911).
10. Id. at 118, 140 S.W. at 890.
11. F. FERuus, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL RExEVis § 326, 441 (1926). This treatise
gives excellent coverage of the history and scope of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus.
12. State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 466, 54 S.W. 494 (En Banc
1899); see also 42 Air. JuR. Prohibition § 8 (1942).
13. State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain, 301 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1957).
14. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278, 290 (Mo. En Banc 1959);
State ex rel. Allen v. Yeaman, 440 S.W.2d 138, 145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969). Courts
have experienced much difficulty in locating and defining the line between those
cases where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, yet undertakes to ex-
197o]-
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The federal courts are in substantial agreement that a writ of prohibi-
tion is not ordinarily available to an aggrieved party to review a trial court's
ruling granting discovery.15 The basis for this position is that the federal
courts do not consider an abuse of discretion as constituting an excess of
jurisdiction;26 rather, an abuse of discretion in the federal courts is con-
sidered mere error which is not subject to prohibition.1 7 When discretion
lies with the lower court in determining whether a motion for discovery
will be granted, a writ of prohibition is not available to review the trial
court's action in granting discovery because error, if any, would be merely
an abuse of discretion and not in excess of jurisdiction.' 8 If the granting
of the order is within the power of the district court, the court has not ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction or violated any law.' 9 Even if the appeals court is of
the opinion that the order is too broad, it will not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial judge.20 The writ will not issue even where the juris-
diction of the trial court is doubtful; the court of appeals must be able to
say that the district court is clearly without jurisdiction to warrant the is-
suance of a writ of prohibition.2'
In the past, contrary to the practice in the federal courts, Missouri
courts have continuously held that prohibition was the proper remedy
where a trial court had improperly required discovery to be made.22 The
ceed such jurisdiction, and those where the court has jurisdiction and is simply
acting erroneously within such jurisdiction. The determination as to when the
erroneous act goes so far beyond the pale of law as to become an excess of juris-
diction can only be made from the peculiar circumstances of the case.
15. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358(10th Cir. 1964); Chemical and Industrial Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.
1962); In re Illinois Cent. RR., 192 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1951); Bank Line, Ltd. v.
United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947); In re Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Moore,
145 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1944); see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1229 (1964).
16. In re Illinois Cent. R.R., 192 F.2d 465, 466 (5th Cir. 1951).
17. Chemical and Industrial Corp., v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1962);
In re Illinois Cent. R.R., 192 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1951).
18. In re Illinois Cent. R.R., 192 F.2d 465, 466 (5th Cir. 1951).
19. Chemical and Industrial Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962).
20. Id. at 129.
21. In re Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Moore, 145 F.2d 128, 129 (8th Cir. 1944).
But see Hartley Pen Co. v. United States, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961), wherein
the extraordinary writ of mandamus was allowed to issue to restrain the district
court from compelling discovery without a finding of an excess of jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
In our view the remedy is available in an ordinary case within our juris-
diction if ordinary remedies are inadequate and there is present excep-
tional and extraordinary circumstances which require the issuance of an
extraordinary writ to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. Id. at 328.
22. State ex rel. Grey v. Jensen, 395 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. En Banc 1965); State
ex tel. Hof. v. Cloyd, 394 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. En Banc 1965); State ex reL. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (En Banc 1953); State ex rel.
Cummings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W.2d 383 (En Banc 1949); State ex
rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d 407 (En Banc
1947); State ex rel. Isbell v. Kelso, 442 S.W.2d 163 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); State
ex rel. Williams v. Vardeman, 422 S.W.2d 400 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); State ex rel.
Houser v. Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); State ex ret. Premier
Panels, Inc. v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); State ex rel. Mid-
America Pipeline Co. v. Rooney, 399 S.W.2d 225 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
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use of the writ for this purpose was justified on the grounds that an order
for discovery not within the bounds of rules 56.01 and 57.0123 was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion and that this abuse constituted an excess of
jurisdiction for which prohibition was the only adequate remedy.24 Under
this practice there was no substantial difference between a discretionary er-
ror and an abuse of discretion, for both would result in an order for dis-
covery not within the bounds of the rules and therefore would be subject to
prohibition.25
In the case of State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd,2 6 the Missouri Supreme Court
voiced its growing impatience with applications for prohibition of orders
compelling answers to interrogatories. 27 While issuing a writ of prohibition
to restrain the trial court's abuse of discretion in ordering answers to cer-
tain interrogatories, the court stated that "this court continues to receive an
inordinate and apparently unnecessary number of applications to regulate
the use of interrogatories." 28 The court reviewed proper discovery pro-
cedures and reaffirmed the proposition that whether questions are proper in
form and substance is for the determination of the trial judge in the exercise
of his discretion. The court did not, in State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd, adopt the
federal practice in regard to prohibition of discovery orders, though it
clearly indicated a necessity for reducing the number of applications for
review of discovery orders.2 9
Although not expressly stated, the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Norfolk v. Dowdo indicates an intention to follow the federal position
in regard to the issuance of prohibition for control of interrogatory prac-
tice. Discussing the degree of error that will be required to constitute an
abuse of discretion to the point where prohibition will lie, the court affirms
the wide discretion of the trial court and states:
The proper function of the appellate court in the situation before
us is to determine whether as a matter of law the trial court abused
its discretion .... Parties should realize that the fact that a writ
is denied does not mean the trial court is error free. It means only
that it has not exceeded its jurisdiction to the point where a writ
will lie.31
The opinion is notice to the members of the bench and bar that henceforth
the appellate courts will not disturb the exercise of discretion by the trial
court in ordering answers to interrogatories except in the rare case where
23. See note 2 supra.
24. State ex rel. Cummings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W.2d 383 (En
Banc 1949); State ex rel. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Rooney, 399 S.W.2d 225 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1965).
25. Since Missouri cases did not require an abuse of discretion as a matter
of law for prohibition to issue, the courts could find an abuse of discretion amount-
ing to an excess of jurisdiction where a federal court would find only discretionary
error not subject to prohibition. See, e.g., note 22 supra.
26. State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd, 394 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
27. Id. at 411.
28. Id.
29. 394 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
30. 448 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
31. Id. at 4 (Emphasis added).
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as a matter of law the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction. If any reason-
able basis for the trial court's order can be found, the order will stand.32
Except in unusual circumstances, an application for prohibition to control
an order compelling answers to interrogatories will be a fruitless effort.3 3
The court reaffirms what has been said in previous opinions regarding re-
view of discovery orders and indicates that these principles are to be strictly
enforced, concluding that "the appellate court is not equipped to deal with
a volume of applications to regulate the use of interrogatories, nor should
there be any need for such recourse."3' 4
GEORGE M. BocK
KIDNEY TRANSPLANT-MENTALLY INCOMPETENT DONOR
Strunk v. Strunk'
One of two brothers, age 28, suffered "from chronic glomerulus nephri-
tis, a fatal kidney disease."2 The other brother, age 27, was a mentally in-
competent ward of the state with an I.Q. of approximately 35, which corre-
sponds to the mental age of a person six years of age. He also suffered from
a speech defect which made communication difficult with those with whom
he was not closely acquainted, and had been committed to a state institu-
tion.3 Physicians determined that a kidney transplant was the only hope
for the brother with nephritis.4 A kidney from a cadaver was considered,
though it was felt that little chance for survival existed under that course
of action. 5 As to the possibility of a kidney from a live donor, all the mem-
bers of the family, except the incompetent, were tested and rejected as
unacceptable "because of incompatibility of blood type or tissue." A
testing of the incompetent proved that he was compatible. His mother, act-
ing as a committee, petitioned the county courtT asking that it grant author-
ity for the transplant. The county court found that, due to "the peculiar cir-
cumstances of this case," the transplant would be of benefit to both brothers,
since the incompetent "was greatly dependent" upon his brother, both
"emotionally and psychologically," and concluded: "that his well-being
would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the
removal of a kidney."s
32. Id. at 3.
33. The unusual circumstances would be where there is a gross abuse of
the trial courts discretion, and if the federal practice is followed completely, there
would also be the exception exemplified by Hartley Pen Co. v. United States, 287
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961). See note 21 supra.
34. 448 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
1. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
2. Id.
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On appeal, the circuit court chancellor, after review of the record,9
agreed with the county court's findings. On further appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, the issue presented was stated by the court:
Does a court of equity have the power to permit a kidney to be
removed from an incompetent ward of the state upon petition of
his committee, who is also his mother, for the purpose of being
transplanted into the body of his brother, who is dying of a fatal
kidney disease?10
The court, in answer to that question, said "We are of the opinion it does."'"
After examining the statutory power of county courts of Kentucky as to
control of incompetent wards, 12 the Court of Appeals held that the county
court did not have the necessary authority to order the transplant,' 3 but
the circuit court did, and, therefore the judgment should be affirmed.14
The court did "not deem it significant that this case reached the circuit
court by way of appeal as opposed to a direct proceeding in that court."'I
Authority for the proposition that chancery courts have the necessary power
to allow a transplant under these circumstances was found by the court
under the equitable doctrine of "substituted judgment,"' 8 the thrust of
which is that a court of equity may deal with the estate and personal af-
fairs of an incompetent in the manner in which the court determines he
would, were he competent.17 The court discussed the development of this
principle under the English common law and in American jurisdictions, 8
9. Id.
10. Id. at 145.
11. Id.
12. Ky. RPEv. STAT. ANN. § 387.230 (1963). Powers and duties of committee;
personal charge may be given to another person; compensation.(1) The power and duty of the committee of a person of unsound
mind shall, in all respects, be the same as those of the guardian of a minor,
except as to education.
(2) The court may appoint a person other than the committee to
take charge of the person of the person of unsound mind when he is
not confined in an asylum, and may order his committee to make necessary
provision for his support.
Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 387.060 (1963). Guardian to control ward and his estate;
compensation.
(1) A guardian shall have the custody of his ward, and the possession,
care and management of the ward's property, real and personal. He shall
provide for the necessary and proper maintenance and education of the
ward out of the estate.
13. 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 148.
17. Ex parte Whitebread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, (Ch. 1816); In re Wil-
loughby, 11 Paige 247 (N.Y. 1844). The Strunk court states:
The inherent rule in these cases is that the chancellor has the power to deal
with the estate of the incompetent in the same manner as the incompe-
tent would if he had his faculties. This rule has been extended to cover
not only matters of property but also to cover the personal affairs of the
incompetent.
445 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Ky. 1969). The court relied in part on 27 Am. JUR. 2d Equity
69 (1966).
18. 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
197o)
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with emphasis on Kentucky cases. 19 The court, further justifying its position,
noted that while statutes had conferred most of the power to deal with
incompetents upon the county courts, courts of equity were still free to
apply common law principles. 20
Once the court had answered the jurisdictional question in the affirm-
ative, there was still a question of whether the circuit court's exercise of its
equity power was reasonable on the facts of this case. The appellate court
stressed the fact that there was seemingly little chance of success from a
cadaver transplant or finding another compatible live donor, and that the
transplant would be of benefit to both donee and donor due to the depend-
ence of the incompetent on his brother.2 1
A dissenting opinion took issue with the majority on the question
of benefit to the donor.22 The dissenter felt the evidence concerning the
psychological effect on the incompetent, should his brother die, did not
conclusively establish a benefit to him, and until such time as significant
benefit could be proved, the court should not authorize such a transplant. 23
The dissent, it should be noted, was not based on the proposition that
equity did not have the necessary jurisdiction or power, but that its power
to act was strictly limited by the requirement of benefit to the incompetent
and the court could only authorize acts clearly in the best interest of the
incompetent.2 4
The court in Strunk clearly applied "substituted judgment" where it
had never before been applied. While the court asserts "the right to act
for the incompetent in all cases, ' 2 5 it also admits that "[w]e are fully cog-
nizant of the fact that the question before us is unique" 28 . . . "[N]o sim-
ilar set of facts has come before the highest court of any of the states of this
nation or the federal courts." 21 It is necessary to note this to put the Ken-
tucky court's action in proper perspective. Lacking any authority squarely
in point, it was forced to apply general principles of equity and reached a
result carefully limited to the facts of the particular case.28
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals correctly indicated that no
court had previously been faced with the same problem presented in Strunk,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts three times has heard similar
cases in which the donor and donee were minor twins and reached the
same result as Strunk.2 9 An analysis of those cases reveals striking similar-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 146-47. Support for this finding came in part from the brief filed
as amicus curiae by the Kentucky Department of Mental Health.
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id. at 151.
24. Id. at 149-51.
25. Id. at 148.
26. Id. at 147.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 146 and 149.
29. Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957);
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Foster v.
Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957). These three cases
were never officially reported; reference to them is based on a thorough discussion
in the NEw YoRK UNIvERSITY LAW REVIEW. See Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kid-
ney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1959).
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ities and possibly significant differences. The Massachusetts court, as did
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, concerned itself with the question of
benefit to the donor.30 As in Strunk, the deleterious emotional impact of the
death of the donee on the donor seemed to be the controlling factor, and
the contention of benefit to the donor was buttressed by psychological testi-
mony.31 Thus, the only authority on the matter would seem to uphold the
Strunk court's use of the benefit test,82 and the cases seem consistent viewed
from this standpoint.
A seemingly important difference in Strunk and the Massachusetts
cases is apparent, however, when one examines the situation of the donor
more closely. Granted, there are cases holding that both minors and mental
incompetents lack the capacity to consent to medical treatment; 33 but one
Massachusetts donor 34 was nineteen years old and the other two were
fourteen, 35 all three were dearly capable of understanding the nature of
the operation and the risks therefrom36 and each dearly gave his consent
in fact.8 7 The opinion in Strunk gives no indication that the donor was
30. Curran, supra note 29 at 893, 896; Strickel, Organ Transplantation in
Medical and Legal Perspective, 32 LAw & CONTEAMp. PROB. 597, 604 (1967); Sanders
and Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney
Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 357, 390 (1967-68); Berman, The Legal
Problems of Organ Transplantation, 18 ViL. L. Rav. 751, 756 (1968).
31. Curran, supra note 29 at 893. Curran questions the validity of psychological
evidence, as did the dissent in Strunk. Curran compares the use of the information
to that in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, 847 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954), and
refers the reader to a critique of that opinion in Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 150, 157-68 in 1954 ANN. Sunvvy Amt. L. 809, 816-27 (1955). Curran's criticism
is noted in Sanders and Dukeminier, Jr., supra note 30, at 604.
32. Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957);
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Foster v.
Harrison, No. 68674 Eq., (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957). The distinction of
benefit to the donor arose in Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.D.C. 1941), where
skin was engrafted from the body of a fifteen year old boy to aid his cousin who
had been severely burned. The question in that case, however, involved the suffi-
ciency of the minor's consent to the operation without that of his parents. The
court cited cases where informed consent by the minor had been held sufficient
to allow the operation, but only when it was to benefit the child. Professor Curran
indicates that Bonner implies the operation would have been permissible even
without any benefit if parental consent had been obtained. Curran, supra note 29,
at 896, n. 21.
33. "It is generally recognized that infants or persons suffering from general
mental incompetence are not legally capable of giving consent on any subject."
Legal Implications of Clinical Investigation, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 359 (1967).
See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.D.C. 1941); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N. C. 598,
155 S.E.2d 108 (1967) for the general common law rule as to incapacity of minors
to consent to medical treatment and Farber v. Olkon, 246 P.2d 710 (Cal. App.
1952), indicating the similar incapacity of incompetents.
84. Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957).
35. Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Aug. 30, 1957);
Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957).
36. Curran, supra note 29, at 893, 895-96.
37. Id. Professor Curran questions the necessity of parental consent at all
given the full understanding of the situation by the minor. He indicates the turn
away from the older common law rule of Bonner to the more modem position that
consent of a child mature enough to understand the significance of the operation
is sufficient. Further, Curran indicates this is the position taken in REsTATE mNT,
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14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss4/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
at all able to comprehend his fate,38 or that he consented in any manner.3 9
Whether this consideration is significant may be a matter of value judg-
ment, but it nevertheless remains a point of distinction between Strunk and
the Massachusetts cases. Persuasive authority for the proposition that actual
consent by an incompetent donor should not be a requirement is implied
in a discussion of the Massachusetts case 40 where the writer states that "[a]
good argument could be made to allow the operation since the consent of
the [minor] would be ineffectual." 41 However, this same author apparently
backs away from this position when he further points out that "the court
would then be depriving the [child] of one of his vital organs without his
consent or, indeed even his intelligent comprehension." 42 Thus, the ques-
tion of lack of actual consent is not answered by the Massachusetts cases
since informed consent was present,43 nor by Strunk in which the issue
was not considered.44
While lack of actual consent is one of the main questions raised by
Strunk, another is raised in the dissenting opinion; that is, the availability
of a kidney from another source.45 The dissenter felt it was very important
that less compatible donors were available and that the kidney of a cadaver
could have been used.40 However, the dissent recognized that success is not
as likely as with a truly compatible donor.47 This analysis poses the question,
should a court refuse to allow a transplant from a mentally incompetent
donor where other sources are available, though the chance of failure is
substantially greatly increased? Obviously the majority of the Strunk court
felt a refusal was not warranted on the set of facts presented. However, there
is no stock answer and each case must be considered on its own facts.
Missouri courts have not yet been faced with a situation comparable
to Strunk or the Massachusetts cases, but the strong probability that similar
facts will arise impells a consideration of the possible result. Whether pro-
bate courts in Missouri could decree a Strunk result is open to question.
While the restrictive construction given former statutes governing the
I
TORTS § 59 (1939). See also Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
Even the Bonner court indicated there are exceptions to the general common
law rule. These include emergency situations, emancipated children, situations
where parents are too remote, and children close to maturity. The court qualifies
each of these, however, with the necessity of benefit to the minor. Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d 121, 122-23 (D.D.C. 1941).
38. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
39. Id.
40. Curran, supra note 29.
41. Id. at 896.
42. Id. at 896.
43. Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957);
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Foster v.
Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957). Curran, supra note
29, at 895.
44. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
45. Id. at 150-51.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 151.
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powers of Missouri probate courts in handling the affairs of incompetents48
would seem to have been eliminated by the expanded language of the Mis-
souri Probate Code of 1955,4 9 certain decisions subsequent to its adoption
appear inconsistent with such a result.50 However, no cases since the 1955
Code have put the necessary questions before the Missouri courts to test
the power of probate to use equity principles in dealing with incompetents'
affairs. Thus, whether a Strunk result could be reached in a Missouri pro-
bate court is a matter of conjecture based upon the language of decisions
dealing with related powers of the probate courts.
Putting aside the possible jurisdictional limitations creating hurdles
for the probate courts of Missouri, would either they or the circuit courts
have the necessary authority to apply the equitable principles used in
Strunk and reach a comparable result? The real question here is whether
" Missouri recognizes the equitable principles used to give relief in Strunk.
The answer would seem to be yes. While not expressly referring to the
doctrine of "substituted judgment," Missouri courts have applied the same
concept in dealing with the estates of incompetents, and, in fact, have
48. In re Cordes' Estate, 116 S.W.2d 207 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); State ex
rel Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938);
Scott v. Royston, 223 Mo. 568, 123 S.W. 454 (1909); Johnson v. Payne & Williams
Bank, 56 Mo. App. 257 (1894); Finney v. State ex rel. Estiss, 9 Mo. 227 (1845).
49. § 472.030, RSMo (1969).
The court has the same legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdic-
tion and to enforce its orders, judgments, and decrees in probate matters
as the circuit court has in other matters and its executions shall be gov-
erned by Chapter 513 RSMo, except that all executions shall be return-
able within thirty days unless otherwise ordered by the court.
50. In re Frechs Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961); Stark v. Moffit, 352
S.W.2d (St. L. Mo. App. 1961). Both Frech and Moffit take seemingly restrictive
views of the powers of probate courts, particularly in light of § 474.030, RSMo(1969). However, the Frech court stated, "Itlhe probate court . . . is . . . without
power to entertain a suit based upon strictly equitable principles." This leaves
open the possibility that a probate court could have ordered a kidney transplant
when the donor was a ward of that court and incompetent to consent. Thus, the
suit was not based upon equitable principles and the court was merely "applying
equitable principles" to matters within its jurisdiction. This has been accepted by
Missouri courts. The Missouri Supreme Court in In re Franz' Estate said, "We
have often held that in determining matters within its jurisdiction a probate
court may apply equitable principles." In re Franz' Estate, 372 S.W.2d 885, 902(Mo. 1963). The court was quoting In re Thomson's Estate, 362 Mo. 1043, 1054,
246 S.W.2d 791, 797 (1952). The court in Moffit did discuss the provision and
noted, "whatever equitable powers a probate court may exercise . . . must be
employed in the discharge of its jurisdiction in probate matters." This is seemingly
consistent with the analysis already applied to Frech. In discussing Moffit, Frech,
and other cases in light of the term "purely equitable matters," the Missouri
Supreme Court has noted: "[W]e would take the term ... to mean... that such
matter... originally did not concern the jurisdiction of the probate court in other
matters pertaining to probate business." First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Mercan-
tile Bank & Trust Co., 376 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Mo. En Banc 1964). It should be noted
also that none of the cases concerning probate jurisdiction decided after the adop-
tion of § 472.030, RSMo (1969) relate to the affairs of incompetents. For a discus-
sion of the effect of the Missouri Probate Code of 1955, see Fratcher, Trusts and
Succession in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 82 (1965); Maus, Probate Law and Practice,
28 Mo. L. Rxv. 588 (1963); Welch, Equity Jurisdiction in Probate Matters Under
the New Code, 1961 WAsH. U. L.Q. 309.
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relied on the same line of development of the law used by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Strunk.5 1 Thus, Missouri law seems to provide the
authority for a court acting under its equitable jurisdiction, if in the best
interest of the incompetent, 52 to order a transplant. The only remaining
consideration involved is advisability. No certain answer can be given to
that inquiry. When a Missouri court is faced with the question, it will be
required, as was the Kentucky court and the Massachusetts court before
it, to examine donee, donor, all the surrounding facts, probably including
psychological testimony, and to make a decision based in the final analysis
on its own judgment.
Thus, Strunk v. Strunk5 3 extends the equitable doctrine of "substituted
judgment" to allow a court to order a kidney transplant when the donor
is incompetent to give his consent. However, under the law of Kentucky,
the order must come not from a probate court, because of its limited
powers, but only from the circuit court. While arguably a probate court in
Missouri could decree the transplant, it is likely that a decree would also
have to be granted in circuit court. Further, Strunk provides no formula
for advisability in every case, but each situation facing a court must be
decided on its own particular facts.
GARY S. DYER
51. See State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1938), authorizing allowance out of an incompetent's estate for one owed
no legal duty of support by the incompetent because it appeared the incompetent
would have supported the relative had he been competent. See also Citizen's State
Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639, 644, 161 S.W. 341, 343 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1913), where the court says "t]he court, if the estate will justify it, may
authorize to be done what it is convinced the insane person would have done
had he been in his right mind." The Shanklin court cited In re Willoughby, 11
Paige 257 (N.Y. 1844) and Ex Parte Whitebread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng.Rep. 878 (L.C.
1816) referred to by the Kentucky court in Strunk. It should be noted that in both
Kemp and Shanklin, the court was dealing with a case that arose in probate court,
but was applying equitable principles. This may add support to the contention
that Missouri probate courts have the jurisdiction found lacking in Strunk. "Chan-
cery courts have been less restricted in making ... allowances than courts acting
under the statutory authority." In re Hoerman's Estate, 247 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Mo.
1952).
52. State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1938); Citizen's State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 693, 161
S.W. 341 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913). While neither case adopts the benefit test of
Strunk and Bonner, and neither in fact deals with medical treatment, they do
deal with the making of allowances from the estate of an incompetent. The
Kemp court indicates, in speaking of the court's purpose in acting, that it should
be "[p]rotecting and preserving the estate in the manner the incompetent himself
would have done if he had retained his faculties." State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold,
supra at 160, 113 S.W.2d at 147. While this lends support to the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment, it also, at least impliedly, indicates the court must act in the
best interest of the incompetent, i.e. for his benefit. The Shanklin court refers to
ex parte Whitebread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (L.C. 1816) and reaches a
conclusion similar to Kemp. Citizen's State Bank v. Shanklin, supra at 644, 161
S.W. at 343.
53. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: OPERATION OF REVERSION UPON
IMPOSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT RACIAL LIMITATION
NOT A VIOLATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Evans v. Abney1
In 1911 Senator Augustus 0. Bacon willed to the City of Macon,
Georgia, as trustee, certain property- to be used as a park exclusively for
the white people of Macon. The park, Baconsfield, remained segregated un-
til 1963 when the city, taking the position that the park was a public facility
which could no longer be managed and maintained on a segregated basis
without violating the constitution, allowed Negroes to use it.2 Members of
the park's Board of Managers then brought suit against the city and cer-
tain residuary beneficiaries of Bacon's estate, asking the court to appoint
substitute trustees for the municipality. Negro citizens of Macon intervened,
alleging that the racial restriction was unconstitutional, and asking the court
to refuse to appoint the trustees. Heirs of Senator Bacon also intervened,
requesting reversion of the trust property to the estate if the petition were
denied. The city resigned as trustee prior to court action. The trial court
accepted the resignation, upheld the validity of the racial limitation, held
the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres not available to alter it, and ap-
pointed three individuals as substitute trustees.3 The court declined to
rule on the conditional request for reversion by the heirs. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that there is a right to be-
queath one's property to a limited class, that charitable trusts are subject
to supervision of a court of equity, and that there is a power to appoint
new trustees to prevent failure of the trust.4
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
"public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public institu-
tion subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of
who now has title under state law." 5 On remand to the Georgia Supreme
Court, that court held that the sole purpose for which the trust had been
created had become impossible to accomplish and that the trust was term-
inated. The trial court was directed to pass upon the contentions of the
heirs and the successor trustees.0 The trial court decided that the trust prop-
erty had, by operation of law, reverted to the heirs; this conclusion was then
affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.7
On a second appeal the United States Supreme Court also affirmed,
6-2, holding that the trust was terminated and that the property reverted
to Bacon's heirs.$ In reaching this result the Court was faced with two
1. Evans v. Abney, 896 U.S. 485 (1970).
2. Watson v. City of Memphis, 378 U.S. 526 (1963).
3. Newton v. City of Macon, 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 309 (Bibb County Super.
Ct. Ga., 1964).
4. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 188 S.E.2d 578 (1964).
5. Evans v. Newton, 882 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
6. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
7. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
8. Evans v. Abney, 896 U.S. 435 (1970).
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basic issues. First, was the racial limitation to be struck from the will through
application of the cy pres9 doctrine? Second, if not, was the failure to strike
the clause a denial of constitutionally protected rights secured by the four-
teenth amendment? The Court responded with a negative answer to both
questions.
The first issue arose as a matter of statutory construction since Georgia
has codified the common law cy pres doctrine.' 0 The cy pres doctrine allows
a court, in a case where a charitable trust has been created, to strike a por-
tion of the will in order to prevent termination of the trust. It has generally
been held that there are three prerequisites to the application of the doc-
trine: (1) creation of a valid charitable trust;"' (2) presence of a general
charitable intent; and (3) impossibility, impractibility, or the illegality of
carrying out the particular testamentary purpose.' 2 This represents the
modern, more liberal interpretation of the doctrine of cy pres.13
The major drawback to the more liberal interpretation of cy pres has
been the requirement that the donor have a general charitable intent.
This is difficult to find in a case where the donor has provided "for this
particular purpose and for no other" or some such similar statement, but
the tendency has been to find an implied general intent wherever possible.
Some courts have held that such phrases as "for this purpose and no other"
merely emphasize the wish of the donor that the property be devoted to the
designated purpose as long as possible and do not necessarily indicate a
desire that the charitable gift fail if it subsequently becomes impossible to
carry out the designated purpose.14 On the other hand, some authorities
take the position that the trust fails where the intention is expressed that
it should, or where the donor presumably would have preferred to have
the trust fail if the particular purpose is impossible of accomplishment.' 5
9. Literally, "as nearly as;" this rule of construction has been used by equity
courts to give effect to an instrument where the literal meaning would be illegal
or impossible to carry out. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 464 (4th ed. 1968).
10. There are two relevant Georgia statutes:
When a valid charitable bequest is incapable for some reason of execution
in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor, or founder, a court
of equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will as nearly as possible
effectuate his intention.
GA. CODE ANN. § 108-202 (1959).
A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried out in
this State; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested
by the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in
which he directs it to be done shall fail from any cause, a court of chancery
may, by approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most similar
to that indicated by the testator.
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-815 (1959).
Some seventeen states have similar statutes; see 4 A. ScoTr, TausTs § 399 (1967).
11. The cy pres doctrine is not applicable to private trusts, although there is
an analogous principle which permits deviation from the terms of the trust in
matters relating to the administration of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs
§ 399, comment a at 298 (1959).
12. See E. FiscH, THE Cy PROs DOCTRINE IN ThE UNITED STATES 1, 128 (1950).
13. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 388 (1959).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 399, comment c at 299 (1959).
15. 4 A. SCoTT, TRUSTS § 399.2 (1967).
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Senator Bacon's will contained such a provision limiting the use of
the park to the ones "herein specifically authorized."'u From this pro-
vision and another part of the will where the Senator expressed his social
philosophy that "in their social relations the two races [Negro and Cau-
casian] should be forever separate and that they should not have pleasure
and recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common," 1
the Georgia courts concluded that Bacon would have rather had the whole
trust fail than have Baconsfield integrated ( i.e., that the general charitable
intent was lacking).' 8 The United States Supreme Court upheld this deter-
mination since it viewed the construction of wills as essentially a state law
question,' 9 but pointed out that the failure to apply the cy pres doctrine
in this case would not prevent another state court from holding cy Pres ap-
plicable in a similar case.2 0
Having determined that the cy p2-es doctrine was not to be applied,
the Court was faced with the issue of whether the reversion2 l of the prop-
erty to the heirs would be a violation of the Constitution. The petitioners
argued that there was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment because the result would be the closing of a public
park to avoid integration. However, the fourteenth amendment only pro-
hibits a state from denying equal protection of the laws and its prohibition
does not directly apply to private action.22
The so-called "state action" requirement calls for a certain degree of
state involvement. Nevertheless the concept of "state action" has never been
clearly defined and there is no synthesis of opinion as to what constitutes
state action. In earlier opinions the Court attempted to apply a simple test
which required official intrusion upon constitutional rights, but this proved
unworkable where a "private" town discriminated,23 where there was a
private election prior to the public election,2 4 where a privately owned
16. The will provided for the land to be used as "a park and pleasure
ground" for the benefit of "the white women, white girls, white boys and white
children" of the City of Macon. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439441 (1970).
17. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 830, 165 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1968).
18. Id.
19. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 444 (1970).
20. Id. at 447.
21. The reversion in this case arose because of a Georgia statute:
Where a trust is expressly created, but no uses are dedared, or are inef-
fectually declared, or extend only to a part of the estate, or fail from any
cause, a resulting trust is implied for the benefit of the grantor, or testator,
or his heirs.
GA. CODE ANN. § 108-106(4) (1959).
Senator Bacon made no express provision in his will for reversion of the trust
property to his heirs. There is language at one point vesting all title and interest,
"including all remainders and reversions" in the City of Macon, but the Georgia
Supreme Court found that this language concerned remainders and reversions
prior to the vesting of legal title in the City of Macon, as trustee, and not remainders
and reversions occurring because of a failure of the trust, which was not contem-
plated by the Senator. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 831, 165 S.E.2d 160, 165 (1968).
22. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1833).
23. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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restaurant that was located within a public building discriminated,25 or
where a state court enforced a racially restrictive covenant in a deed.26 The
test that evolved from these cases, as clearly as can be ascertained, was the
"public function" test which was applied in Evans v. Newton:27 where a
governmental service is being performed, that performance must be in com-
pliance with fourteenth amendment rights, even if those individuals pro-
viding the service are not officially connected with the government.
Although the majority opinion found this to be a case of private
discrimination, thus involving no "state action," it did not answer ade-
quately the arguments put forth by Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent concern-
ing the fourteenth amendment. As Brennan points out, there are several
grounds upon which a finding of state action could probably have been
sustained in Abney. A Georgia statute,28 enacted six years prior to the date
of Bacon's will, expressly authorized the devise of land to be held in char-
itable trust for use as a park open to one race only; a state court had upheld
the validity and enforced the reversion that came into operation when
discrimination was no longer possible; and as the result of state judicial
action a park which has been operated as a public facility for more than
fifty years was closed. The strongest of these arguments appears to be that
this case represented a form of state-encouraged private discrimination
prohibited under the Court's ruling in Reitman v. Mulkey.2 9 The state
encouragement in this case is based on the Georgia statute30 which specif-
ically authorized the racial limitation in charitable trusts. The effect of the
Georgia statute was to encourage discrimination.31
However, even if it were conceded that there was state action, in order
25. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
26. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1(1948).
27. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
28. See GA. CODE ANN. § 69-504 (1967) which provides:
Any person may, by appropriate conveyance, devise, give, or grant to any
municipal corporation of this State, in fee simple or in trust, or to other
persons as trustees, lands by said conveyance dedicated in perpetuity to
the public use as a park, pleasure ground, or for other public purpose,
and in said conveyance, by appropriate limitations and conditions, provide
that the use of said park, pleasure ground, or other property so conveyed
to said munidpality shall be limited to the white race only, or to white
women and children only, or to the colored race only, or to colored women
and children only, or to any other race, or to the women and children of
any other race only, that may be designated by said devisor or grantor; and
any person may also, by such conveyance, devise, give, or grant in per-
petuity to such corporations or persons other property, real or personal,
for the development, improvement, and maintenance of said property.
(Acts 1905, p. 117).
29. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In this case the Court upheld the California Supreme
Court's invalidation of an amendment to the California Constitution that would
have in effect prevented the state from denying individuals the right to discrim-
inate when selling, leasing, or renting property.
50. See note 28, supra.
31. The majority dismissed this argument because there was no evidence
that Bacon had relied on the statute when drafting his will; but note the similarity
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to violate the fourteenth amendment, there must be state action that
discriminates. It is this discrimination, rather than the state action, that
was lacking in Abney. The existence of discrimination in regard to the use
of the park was eliminated by Evans v. Newton32 where the Court held that
the park could not be operated on a segregated basis by the city or by
private substitute trustees; thus after Newton there was no possible
way the park could be operated discriminatorily. As the Court correctly
points out, the penalty, the dosing of the park, is imposed on Negroes and
whites alike. Any possible discrimination has to be based on the premise
that the dosing for the purpose of avoiding desegregation "generates [in
Negroes] a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."3 3
The Court was unwilling to extend the "badge of inferiority" argument to
that point. The majority opinion thus implies that while the Negroes have
a constitutional right to use the park as long as it is a park, they have no
right to insist that it continue to be used as a park.
By summarily dismissing the state action argument, the Court indicates
a tendency to avoid this test that has never had a definite standard of appli-
cation and has been the subject of much comment and criticism.3 4 In all
probability the Court will continue to "sift facts and weigh circumstances"35
on a case by case basis. After Abney it is clear that all judicial aid in enforc-
ing private discrimination will not necessarily be unconstitutional. But it is
unclear why the majority in Abney declined to meet squarely the arguments
advanced by Justice Brennan in his dissent. One possible answer is that a
consequence of ruling that Bacon had no right to limit the beneficiaries of
the trust to one race might render illegal trusts that are beneficial to
Negroes. However, this could be averted by subjecting discriminatory
trusts to a test similar to the one applied to legislation which involves a
racial classification. Under McLaughlin v. Florida3 6 such a legislative
classification must have an overriding public purpose and be necessary to
the enforcement of the policy.
CniRL-.s N. DRENNAN
32. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
33. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
34. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. Rav. 1083 (1960);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347 (1963).
,35. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
36. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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BAD DEBT RESERVES AND THE 351 TRANSFER
Nash v. United States'
Prior to 1960 taxpayer James G. Nash and others had operated as
partnerships several financial institutions. On June 1, 1960, the partner-
ships separately incorporated eight different finance businesses in accord-
ance with section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.2 Among the partner-
ship assets transferred to the corporations were accounts receivable with a
basis to the partnerships of $486,853.69, and reserve for bad debt accounts
with balances of $73,028.05, which taken together represented the net book
value of the accounts receivable. The Commissioner determined that the
partnerships should have included as income in 1960 $73,028.05, the amount
of the bad debt reserves. The taxpayer paid the asserted deficiency and
sued for refund in the District Court of the Northern District of Alabama.3
This refund was allowed, but on appeal the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,4 holding that the reserves repre-
sented prior deductions from taxable income of the partnerships which
should be restored to income upon transfer of the accounts receivable.
This holding was directly contrary to the holding of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,5 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari8 to resolve the conflict. In a brief, seven paragraph
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Commissioner's con-
tention based upon the tax benefit rule. This rule requires that recovery
of an item which has produced a tax benefit in a prior year be included
as income in the year of recovery. Though the establishment of the re-
serves had resulted in deductions to the partnerships in prior years (a tax
benefit), the Court reasoned that there was no "recovery" because the bal-
ances in the reserve accounts were reasonable and the value of the stock
received was equal to the "net" value of the receivables. 7 Such a transfer, the
Court said, "merely perpetuates the status quo and does not tinker with
it for any double benefit out of the bad debt reserve."8
1. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
2. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 851(a).
(a) General Rule.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is trinsferred to
a corporation (including, in the case of transfers made on or before June 30, 1967,
an investment company) by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation. For pur-
poses of this section, stock or securities issued for services shall not be considered
as issued in return for property.
3. Birmingham Trust National Bank v. United States, 22 AMx. FED. TAX R.2d
5202 (1968).
4. Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 629, 24 Am. FED. TAX R.2d 69-5272 (5th
Cir. 1969).
5. Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 17 Am. FED. TAX R.2d
242 (9th Cir. 1966).
6. 396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
7. 398 U.S. 1 (1970). Justices Black and Stewart dissented, adopting in a
brief statement the reasoning of Judge Tuttle's opinion for the court of appeals in
the Nash case, 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969) and in Judge Raum's opinion for the
tax court in Schuster v. Commissioner 50 T.C. 98 (1968).
8. 398 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
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While the Court's opinion has provided an answer for the situation,
it has failed to resolve completely the conflict of rationales differing courts
have used to support their decisions. These rationales concern the account-
ing techniques for reserves for bad debts, policy reasons behind section
351 and its interplay with section 166.9 The objective of this note is to
outline briefly the conflict among the courts on this issue, and then to
attempt to explain the decision of the Supreme Court by considering ac-
counting theory and the purpose of section 351.
The Revenue Act of 192110 first expanded the policy of tax free trans-
fer of businesses and business assets to transfers to controlled corporations.
Section 351, which was derived from that expansion, permits sole propri-
etors and partners who desire to incorporate their business to make this
transformation to the corporate form without recognizing any gain or
loss on their exchange of business assets for stock whenever the transferors
retain a minimum of 80%, control in the new corporation. 1 In such an
exchange the transferor takes the same basis in the stock of the new cor-
poration as he had in the business assets or partnership interest contributed
to the corporation. 12 The result is a postponement of gain or loss until
the taxpayer disposes of his stock in the new corporation, thus making the
option of doing business as a corporation attainable free of any federal
income tax barrier.
The treatment of a bad debt reserve in a section 351 transfer has been
the source of dispute between the Commissioner and taxpayers for almost
a decade. A revenue ruling in 196213 resolved the question in the Commis-
sioner's favor by requiring that balances in the reserve account for bad
debts of the transferor be restored to income in the year of transfer. This
was justified on a tax benefit theory that additions to the reserve taken
as deductions by the transferor in previous years were no longer needed
once the accounts receivable had been transferred to the corporation.
This theory was adopted by the Tax Court in Estate of Schmidt v.
Commissioner.14 There the taxpayer had used the accrual method of ac-
counting for tax purposes and had received permission to use the reserve
method of accounting for bad debts, a situation identical to that in the
Nash case. 15 The attempted transfer of the accounts receivable at "net
value" by transferring both the accounts receivable and the reserve for
bad debts to the new corporation was disapproved. The Tax Court char-
9. INT. REY. CODE of 1954, § 166(c). This provision allows taxpayers to use
the reserve method of accounting for bad debt expense.
10. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202, 42 Stat. 229.
11. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351.
12. If in addition to the stock, money or property is received by the trans.
feror in exchange for the business assets or partnership interest, any gain on the
exchangd is recognized, but the gain may not exceed the amount of money or the
fair market value of property received, and no loss may be recognized. This is
the rule for "boot." INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 351(b).
13. Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 Cum,. BULL. 189.
14. 42 T.C. 1130 (1964).
15. The privilege of using the reserve method is available for both cash
method and accrual method taxpayers; thus the problem of tax free transfer con-
fronts both accrual method and cash method taxpayers. See Hutton v. Commis-
sioner, 53 T.C. 87 (1969).
1970]
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acterized the reserve as previously earned income that had escaped taxation
by assignment to the reserve as a contingency against debt failure. The
court reasoned that since section 351 postpones only gain or loss on the
transfer of assets, it would not apply to reserves consisting of previously
earned income. The reserve belonged to the taxpayer himself, and would
no longer be needed to secure him against bad debt losses; therefore, it
should be restored to his income.1
On appeal in the Schmidt case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealsl T
reversed the Tax Court. It attached special significance to the fact that
the par value of the stock taken by the taxpayer in exchange for assets of
the business indicated that the accounts receivable were being transferred
at their "net value," or the value equal to the face amount less the balance
held in reserve against bad debts. Requiring restoration of the reserve to
the income of the taxpayer forced him to recapture deductions taken in
establishing the reserve, while the difference between the face value of
the accounts receivable and the consideration received could not under
section 851 be recognized as a loss. The court agreed that no loss on
the transfer should be recognized, but it reasoned that the recapture was
improper. The losses had been recognized in the year of deduction, and
until consideration was received which exceeded the net amount of the
receivables and disproved the correctness of the original deductions, no
recapture should be required.' 8 Therefore, the reserve for bad debts ac-
count was a valuation account that should be allowed to pass along with
the accounts receivable to the transferee corporation.' 9
The Tax Court remained unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing, however, and beginning with Bird Management, Inc. v. Commissioner0
launched a continuing effort to sustain its views. While the Bird Manage-
ment case concerned a section 837 liquidation which is distinguishable from
the 851 situation,2' the Tax Court included in its opinion the following
dicta:
16. Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964).
17. Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 17 Am. FED. TAX R.2d
242 (9th Cir. 1966).
18. Section 358 and section 362 govern the basis which the transferee takes in
assets received in a § 351 exchange, and they provide, in general, that the trans-
feree takes the same basis as the transferor had in the assets, subject to several ad-justments not relevant to the question here. If the reserve for bad debts account is
considered an adjustment to the accounts receivable, then- under these two sections
the reserve should pass with the accounts receivable to the transferee corporation.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 358, § 362.
19. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished prior deisions of its
oWn. (West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 7 Am. FED. TAX R.2d
790 (9th Cir. 1961); Citizens Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1961).) In these cases the court had required balances in bad debt
reserve accounts recognized 'as income by corporate taxpayers selling assets pur-
suant to the provisions of § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to
liquidation sale. The court said in those situations the excess of the proceeds from
sale of the accounts receivable over the net value of the receivables was a recovery
of the loss on bad debts since there was no continuity of ownership and the trans-
feror would never again experience the risk of bad debt losses.
20. 48 T.C. 586 (1967).
21. See the Schmidt court's explanation in footnote 19 supra.
[Vol. 85
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It is true that in Estate of Heintz Schmidt v. Commissioner (cita-
tion omitted) the Court of Appeals held that the bad debt reserve
may not be added back to income unless the creditor "received"
consideration upon the sale of debts sufficient to cover the bad
debt reserve. With all due respect, we think the Court of Appeals
has misconceived the theory that calls for the inclusion of the bad
debt reserve in income. It is not that the creditor has "received"
something or "realized" something in the usual sense. Rather, it is
an accounting concept that one who has taken a deduction for bad
debts in earlier years must, in accordance with that method of
accounting, restore that deduction to income in a later year when
it becomes clear that no bad debt expense will occur.2 2
The Tax Court followed this by holding for the Commissioner in the
section 351 situation in Schuster v. Commissioner,23 and again in Hutton
v. Commissioner.24
The Tax Court was not unanimous in its views, however. In the
Schuster case 25 Judge Simpson pointed to the purpose of section 351 and
argued that while there was no statutory authorization to carry over the
bad debt reserves to the transferee, several types of depreciation carryovers
were allowed.2 6 In urging that the carryover of the reserve be allowed, he
pointed to the reorganization situation where carryovers of tax attributes
had been permitted before the enactment of section 351.27
In 1969 the Tax Court was joined by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals which specifically recognized the Tax Court's position when it
decided for the Commissioner in the Nash case.28 In its opinion the court
expressed its agreement with the Tax Court in emphasizing the nature of a
reserve for bad debts as the result of an accounting practice used to pro-
tect the business from possible future losses on bad debts. Additions to
the reserve, and the related deductions were allowed only to the extent
that they could be shown by the taxpayer to be reasonable in light of the
expectancies of debt losses, and when those expectancies were foreclosed,
such as by sale or transfer of the accounts receivable, the balance of the
reserve should be restored to income.
In addition to a tax benefit analysis, the court of appeals in Nash
expressed concern over tax avoidance; it reasoned that while the reserve
was established through deductions from gross income taxed at individual
rates, if the reserve were transferred to the corporation and then later
22. Bird Management Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 586, 597 (1967).
23. 50 T.C. 98 (1968).
24. 53 T.C. 37 (1969).
25. Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98, 103 (1968).
26. Judge Simpson referred here to the fact that a § 351 transfer did not
trigger recapture of investment credit under § 47(b), nor recapture of excess de-
preciation under § 1245(b)(3) and § 1250(d) (3).
27. Judge Simpson was referring here to Helvering v. Metro Edison Co.,
306 U.S. 522 (1923), allowing deductions of unamortized bond discount to a merger
transferee, and to Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931 (1932), requiring a tax-
payer to recognize untaxed undistributed profits of pre-1921 operations upon
liquidations of a transferee corporation.
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abandoned because of improved debt recovery or adoption of an6ther
system of accounting for bad debts, the reserve would be restored to the
income of the corporation and would be taxed at lower corporate rates.
Thus, the result would be not a mere "postponement of the incidence of
the tax, but a change in the identity of the taxpayer." 29 The conclusion of
the court, then, was that to permit the reserve account to pass to the corpora-
tion would allow the taxpayer to recognize as a loss the mere expectancy
of debt failure reflected in the balance of the reserve account.
The Supreme Court was certainly justified in granting certiorari on
this question. The situation was one that should occur frequently, that is,
whenever a sole proprietorship or partnership which used the reserve
method of accounting for bad debts for tax purposes incorporates with the
transferors retaining 80% control. A uniform and simple solution was
required, but the lower court decisions provided solutions that were
neither uniform nor simple. By the time the Nash case came to the Court,
taxpayers were avoiding the Tax Court as a forum on this question,
conflicting precedents had been established in the circuit courts, and at
least two district court cases30 had ruled for the taxpayers under the Schmidt
theory.
The Supreme Court, however, based its decision primarily on an inter-
pretation of section 11131 and the tax benefit rule, saying that a transfer
of accounts receivable at net value is not a "recovery" within the meaning
of section 111, and that the reserve against bad debts should follow the
risk of noncollection. A better explanation is probably warranted on a
question as vigorously disputed as this.
One underlying issue that divides the two positions is the nature and
purpose of the reserve account for bad debts. The common view of the
Fifth Circuit and the Tax Court is that the reserve is allowed to a given
taxpayer as a contingency account against the possibility of future failures
to collect presently held receivables. The reasonable estimates of this
possibility are allowed as a reduction of taxable income, creating an ac-
count of untaxed income of prior periods held against this contingency.
The Schmidt view, however, characterizes the reserve as a valuation account
used to distribute the cost of debt failure to the period of operations, much
like the depreciation reserve is used to amortize the cost of nonpermanent
capital assets. A quote from a tax article by Albert E. Arent which the
29. Id. at 651.
30. Rowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1268 (W. D. Ky. 1969), and Scofield v.
United States 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9386 (C. D. Calif. 1969).
31. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 111(a).(a) General Rule.-Gross income does not include income attributable to
the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delin-
quency amount, to the extent of the amount of the recovery exclusion
with respect to such debt, tax, or amount.§ 11l(b)(4) defines "recovery exclusion" as those recoveries of bad debts, prior
taxes, and delinquency amounts which "did not result in a reduction of the tax,
payer's tax . . ." in prior tax years. § 111 is the basis of the "tax benefit rule,"
though it is often applied to recoveries of prior deductions other than bad debts,
prior taxes, or delinquency amounts. See MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOM TAX-
ATION § 7.34-35. (1969 Ed.)
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Supreme Court footnoted in its opinion 32 seems to indicate that at least
in this situation the Court felt the reserve was a valuation account which
adjusted the face value of receivables to their present value.
The Schmidt view also seems to be more in accord with accounting
theory. On this issue the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants has said:
A so-called reserve for bad debts . . . does not in itself involve
retention or holding of assets, identified or otherwise, for any pur-
pose. Its function is rather a part of a process of measurement, to
indicate a diminution or decrease in an asset due to a specified
cause.
33
Under correct accounting procedures, then, the reserve would be
merely a valuation account used to adjust the face amount of the accounts
receivable to their estimated present value. Under these circumstances a
carryover of the reserve account to the transferee would be as justifiable as
the carryover of the normal depreciation accounts, a practice which, as
Judge Simpson pointed out in his Schuster dissent,3 4 is permitted.
A related question that appears to have gone unconsidered is the
point in time when the losses actually occur. Under the accrual method of
accounting both income and expenses are entered at the time the obli-
gations are recognized, rather than when they are actually received or
paid, in order to match income and expenses more accurately.35 When a
business accepts promises to pay in the future in lieu of cash, it does so
knowing that some portion of its receivables will go uncollected. This is a
"cost" of producing that income which is presently recognized under the
accrual system, and that "cost," if it is to be matched with the income
it has produced, should under the accrual system also be presently recog-
nized.
To a cash basis taxpayer, the reserve account should perform the same
purpose. The accounts receivable represent the same capital investment to
both kinds of taxpayers.3 6 The cash basis taxpayer measures his income for
tax purposes by measuring the flow out of accounts receivable and into
cash, while the accrual basis taxpayer measures the flow of credits into the
accounts receivable to determine his income. Both taxpayers, however,
32. Arent, Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with Forma-
tion and Liquidation of Corporations, 41 TAxrs 995, 998 (1962), as quoted in foot-
note 5, 398 U.S. at 5.
33. Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1, 2 A.P.B. AccOUrxNG PRINCIPLEs
9515, August 1953, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
34. Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98, 103 (1968).
35. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 12.60-12.94 (1969 Ed.).
36. In considering bad debt reserves for banks the I.R.S. has said in a Treasury
Decision at 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 26 the following concerning bad debt reserves of
cash basis taxpayers:
The Tax Court has held that the 'use of the reserve for bad debts is not in-
herently inconsistent with a cash basis where, as here, the reserve is against
a loss of capital only * a and contains no elements of income that has
never been reported. * Such a reserve for loss of capital does not differ
materially from a reserve for depredation which is set up on a percentage
basis rather than on the basis of actual depredation suffered.
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will experience some depreciation in value of their capital invested in
accounts receivable, and like the depreciation in value of any other non-
permanent capital investment, this loss should be amortized to the period
of operations in order to recognize the "expense" of this loss during the
period when it occurs. These elementary accounting principles are well
recognized by textbook authorities.3 7
This amortizing or matching objective of the reserve method of ac-
counting for bad debts bears directly on its treatment in the 351 transfer.
When the reserve is not allowed to be transferred along with the receiv-
ables, what in effect happens is that the "cost" of accepting receivables in
lieu of cash is allocated to the transferee corporation, while the income is
recognized by the transferor and the purpose behind the reserve method
is thwarted. In the situation where the consideration received for transfer
of assets indicates that the receivables were transferred at their net value,
this reallocation of costs would seem to be fairly dear.
The Fifth Circuit in its Nash opinion was especially troubled by what
it characterized as "a change in the identity of the taxpayer" 38 in a situation
where reserves transferred to a corporation would later have to be restored
to income because of improved debt recovery or abandonment of the re-
serve method. This would in fact result in taxing at corporate rates what
would otherwise have been income to the individual or to the partners.
However, where the estimate of the diminution in value of receivables
has been reasonable and accurate, the government should not be prejudiced
by this situation because the receivables would have been transferred at
their then present value, and any appreciation of value due to a general
improvement in payment practices of debtors would have occurred after
the date of the transfer. This would be no different than an outright sale
of the receivables at market value to an independent corporation followed
by an appreciation in their value.
The alternative situation, where the corporation would abandon the
reserve method and recognize the amount in the reserve account as income,
would also cause no prejudice. Any income realized by the corporation in
the year of abandonment would be offset in later periods by the deduction
for bad debts when the corporation failed to collect. This would be no
different than the tax consequences to any given taxpayer who having pre-
37. H. SIMTONs and W. KARRENBROCK, INTERmEDIATE ACCOUNTING 173 (4th ed.
1964):
Almost invariably some of the receivables arising from sales will prove un-
collectible. Uncollectible amounts will have to be anticipated if the charge
for them is to be related to the period of the sale, and receivables are to
be stated at their estimated realizable amounts. The amount of receivables
uncollectible is recorded by a charge to Bad Debts and a credit to Allow-
ance for Bad Debts.
H. FINNEY and H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 176 (6th ed. 1965):
The creation of an allowance for doubtful accounts is intended to ac-
complish two results, namely:
To charge the loss by the sale of goods to customers whose accounts
prove to be uncollectible against the period that caused the loss.
To show the estimated realizable value of the customers accounts.
38. Nash v. United States, 414 F. 2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1969).
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viously used the reserve method, would abandon that method and begin
recognizing losses only after accounts fail when payable. Thus, in either
situation, so long as the reserve contained a reasonably accurate balance
at transfer, that would be no misallocation of income and little, if any,
possibility of tax avoidance.
The real danger of tax avoidance in this situation, then, is a result
of permitting overstatements of the reserve account before the transfer
or at the time of transfer, rather than permitting the transfer itself. Thus,
the effective way to insure against tax avoidance would be to scrutinize
the valuation of the reserve to insure that it properly adjusts the balance
of the accounts receivable to their present value. The Commissioner pres-
ently has the authority3 9 to insure against tax avoidance in this manner,
and at least one writer has suggested that this would be the better method.40
To summarize the analysis of the technical aspects of allowing transfer
of the reserve for bad debts, it appears that for a taxpayer who complies or
who is forced to comply with section 166, the reserve account is a recogni-
tion of costs incurred in producing income of prior periods. To force the
taxpayer to recognize this as income results in shifting these costs to the
transferee, causing an understatement of the transferee's income as well
as an overstatement of the transferor's income.
More important than the technical aspects, however, should be the
policy reasons for the existence of section 351: to remove any federal in-
come tax barrier that would otherwise affect the availability of business
organizational forms. This same policy is reflected in other sections, in-
cluding sections 355, 361, and 371. 4 1 Requiring the taxpayer to recognize
as taxable income his reserve for bad debts amounts to placing a pecuniary
burden on the decision to incorporate. While the significance of this
tended to be diminished or ignored by the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit,
writers have been quick to criticize this aspect of the restoration view,42
which as one such critic declared, had transformed incorporation under
section 351 into a "semi-taxable event." 43
39. Since 1959 the Commissioner has had authority under Treas. Reg. § 1.166-4(1959), to require that excesses or inadequacies in existing reserves be reflected in
establishing the addition to the reserve in any current year. In addition, taxpayers
are required to file a statement with their return showing volume of charge sales
or business transactions on account during the taxable year, total amounts of notes
and accounts receivable at the beginning and close of the year, amount of debts
charged off against the reserve during the taxable year, and the method of com-
puting the addition to the reserve.
40. Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization, the Threat of the Potential
Income Item and a Sensable Approach to the Problems of Thinness, 40 TAxEs 974,
978, n.7 (1962).
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355, § 361, § 371.
Section 355 concerns corporate split-ups and spin-offs, § 361 concerns transfers
during business reorganizations, and § 371 concerns transfers during reorganization
under receivership, foreclosure and certain proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.
All contain provisions for tax free exchanges.
42. 1966 U. ILL. L. REv. 787, 12 N. Y. L. FoRauxi 145 (1966), 53 MINN. L. REv.
1854 (1969).
43. Arent, Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with Formation
and Liquidation of Corporations, 40 TAx= 995 (1962).
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Legislative history indicates rather clearly that removal of any tax
barrier was the underlying intent of Congress. The original provisions were
part of the Revenue Act of 192144 which were explained in the Senate
committee report as follows:
Section 202 provides new rules for those exchanges or "trades"
in which, although a technical "gain" may be realized under the
present law, the taxpayer actually realizes no cash profit.
In summary the report stated:
The preceding amendments, if adopted, will, by removing a source
of grave uncertainty and by eliminating many technical construc-
tions which are economically unsound, not only permit business to
go forward with readjustnents required by existing conditions but
also will considerably increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers
from taking colorable losses in wash sales and other fictitious
exchanges.45
It is this policy consideration of removing all tax barriers that dis-
tinguishes this problem from that of the treatment of the reserve upon
liquidation of business assets.40 There the failure to restore the reserve to
income results in total escape from taxation. Additionally, in the 337 case
there is neither possibility nor need to transfer the reserve since the
outsider transferee will take the accounts receivable at his own cost basis.
While the Tax Court ignored this distinction and relied on liquidation
case opinions to support restoration in section 351 cases,47 the distinction
was recognized by both writers48 and a dissenting opinion 49 who clearly
realized the significance of continuity in the tax free transfer philosophy.
In its opinion, the 'Supreme Court recognized this underlying policy
only by a quotation of section 851(a), and chose instead to discuss why the
tax benefit rule did not apply. However, the basic purpose of section 851,
which is obvious from the mere reading of part (a) of that section, must
have been an influential factor in the Court's decision. The Court at
least realized the economic realities of the situation when it stated that
the transfer of the reserve account "merely perpetuates the status quo and
does not tinker with it for any double benefit." 50 While this is a rather
negative way of defining the underlying policy, the results of the opinion
can only be positive. To have tax administration following accounting
theory is desirable; to have tax administration remain a neutral influence
on the choice of business form is necessary-no "tinkering" can be tolerated.
STEPHEN D. HOYNE
44. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202, 42 Stat. 229.
45. S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
46. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 387. See footnote 19 supra.
47. Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98 (1968); Estate of Schmidt v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964).
48. 1966 U. ILL. L. REv., 787, 12 N. Y. L. FORUM 145 (1966), 53 MINN. L. REv.
1354 (1969).
49. Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964), Simpson dis-
sent in Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98, 108 (1968).
50. 898 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: WHEN DOES THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN TO RUN?
Frohs v. Greene'
Plaintiff, Mary Frohs, in 1951 received penicillin injections from de-
fendant and other doctors. A short time later she experienced severe pains,
but defendants assured her that any possible problems connected with the
injections had been counteracted and that the pain she suffered was in no
way connected with the injections. They were unable to determine any
other cause of her difficulties, however. In 1965 physicians removed an
artery from plaintiff's temple which indicated that the severe pains were
attributable to defendants' treatment in 1951.
Plaintiff filed an action for medical malpractice against defendants,
who demurred to the complaint on the ground that the statute of lim-
itations had run.2 Plaintiff, however, argued that the statute did not begin
to run until she discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered, her injury, thereby urging the court to adopt the so-
called "discovery rule" (or, as it is otherwise known, the "capable of ascer-
tainment" test). The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer. Plaintiff
appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court which reversed and remanded,
adopting the discovery rule but concluding that although sufficient in this
case the statute of limitations would bar such an action unless the allega-
tions are sufficient to show that by the exercise of reasonable care plaintiff
could not have discovered that her pain was attributable to defendants'
injections.3
The court was of the opinion that since Oregon had adopted the
discovery rule in a "foreign object" case 4 in which a surgical needle had
1. - Ore. -, 452 P.2d 564 (1969).
2. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 (1) (1957):
An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, for criminal conver-
sion, or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on
contract, shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an
action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed
to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.
It is interesting to note that the statute under which the Frohs case arose
was amended after the suit was instituted but before it was argued. The amended
statute provides:
An action to recover damages for injuries to the person where in the
course of any medical ... treatment or operation, any foreign substance
other than flesh, blood or bone, is introduced and is negligently per-
mitted to remain within the body of a living human person, causing
harm, shall be commenced within two years from the date when the
injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
been discovered; provided that such action shall be commenced within
seven years from the date of the treatment or operation upon which the
action is based. ORE. R-v. STAT. § 12.110 (4) (1967).
The Frohs court did not presume to decide the effect of this amendment.
It would appear, however, to introduce confusion because Frohs adopts the dis.
covery rule in all cases while the statute only applies to foreign object cases.
3. Frohs v. Greene, -- Ore. -, 452 P.2d 564 (1969).
4. Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966).
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been left in the patient's abdomen, it was impossible to justify applying
the rule in that kind of case while refusing to apply it in cases involving
negligent treatment and diagnosis.5 In so extending the discovery rule
the court specifically overruled Wilder v. Haworth,6 a malpractice case in
which the court refused to accept the discovery rule where the only
negligence alleged was in the diagnosis and treatment itself.
In adopting the discovery rule in Frohs the court merged two related
lines of Oregon cases: those concerning purely negligent diagnosis and
treatment, and those concerning foreign objects negligently left in the
body. In Wilder v. Haworth,7 decided in 1950, the court refused to apply
the discovery rule in a case of negligent treatment, holding that the statute
of limitations began to run at the termination of treatment.3 In the 1964
case of Vaughn v. Langmack,9 which involved the negligent leaving of a
surgical needle in the plaintiff's body, the court held that the two year
statute of limitations began to run at the time, of the wrongful act and
not when the needle was discovered. Yet the court overruled this latter
decision in 1966, stating that the discovery rule should apply in such a
case.10 The Frohs case, by overruling Wilder, has allowed the negligent
diagnosis and treatment cases to be governed by the discovery rule as well.:1
The so-called "discovery rule" has been adopted in eighteen states
by statutory interpretation of existing statutes of limitation.' 2 These states
give varying reasons for such interpretations. Some of the courts say that
use of any different rule would allow an unjust result, and that they
refuse to attribute an unjust or impractical intention in enacting the lim-
5. Frohs v. Greene, - Ore. -, -, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (1969). Defendant
attempted to distinguish the two types of malpractice cases by pointing out that
in the foreign object cases proof of the negligent act and the part it played in
the injury is reliable, while this reliability is not present in claims for negligent
treatment and diagnosis.
6. 187 Ore. 688, 213 P.2d 797 (1950).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. 236 Ore. 542, 390 P.2d 142 (1964).
10. Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966).
11. Cf. 1 LOUISELL AND WILLIAMs, MEDICAL MA'RACTICE §§ 13.14-13.64 (1969).
12. Arizona: Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967); California:
Tell v. Taylor, 191 Cal. App. 2d 266, 12 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1961); Colorado: Davis
v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957); Florida: City of Miami v. Brooks,
70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954); Hawaii: Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150,
433 P.2d 220 (1967); Idaho: Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485,
389 P.2d 224 (1964); Louisiana: Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So. 2d
35 (1963); Maryland: Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825
(1966); Michigan: Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963);
Montana: Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967); Ne-
braska: Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); New Jersey:
Rothman v. Silber, 83 N.J. Super. 192, 199 A.2d 86 (1964); New York: Flanagan
v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969);
North Dakota: Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Oklahoma:
Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962); Pennsylvania: Ayers v. Morgan, 397
Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Texas: Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 ('rex.
1967); West Virginia: Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Two
federal cases have also adopted the discovery rule. Quinton v. United States, 304
F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962) (FELA case); Rahn v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 775
(S.D. Ga. 1963) (FTCA case).
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itation statute?13 In Gaddis v. Smith1 4 the Texas Supreme Court, in justify-
ing its acceptance of the discovery rule in foreign object cases, observed
that when a surgeon leaves an object in a patient's body, the patient
would not know nor have reason to know that the object was present.
The Gaddis court also refuted the argument that acceptance of the dis-
covery rule would obliterate the statute of limitations, noting that the
question of when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one which must
be founded on reason and justice.
The four states which have adopted the rule by statute impose a
double limitation by setting a time limit in which the claim must be
brought after discovery of the injury, not to exceed an ultimate time limit
which runs from the date of the negligent act itself.15 Thus if a physician
negligently treats a patient, and the patient does not discover it until
sometime later, the patient must bring his action both within a specified
period after this discovery, and within a specified period running from the
negligent act itself.
Under the traditional or "wrongful act" rule the statute of limitations
begins to run on the date of the negligent act or omission. A number of
courts still follow this rule.' 6 In refusing to reject this traditional ap-
proach, these courts reason that the legislatures are the proper bodies to
change the rules regarding the limitations set by the statute.17 These
18. Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968). This case does not accept the
discovery rule as such since the Delaware statute is not typical. The Delaware
statute begins to run when the injury is sustained rather than when the cause
of action has accrued; but this case is consistent with the trend, and the reason-
ing of the court is similar to those decisions adopting the discovery rule. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8118 (1958).
14. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
15. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25 (1) (Supp. 1955), a limit six months from the time
of discovery and six years from the injury, applying to all malpractice cases;
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rsv. § 52-584 (1958), a one year limit from discovery and a
three year limit from the negligent act, applying to all malpractice cases; ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1965), a two year limit from discovery and ten years from
the negligent act, limited to foreign object cases; ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.110 (4)
(1967), a two year limit from discovery and seven years from the negligent act.
This Oregon statute on its face appears to apply only to foreign object cases, but
is somewhat confusing in the light of the cited case. See note 2 supra.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 87-205 (1947); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App.
133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917); Gra-
ham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936); Carter v. Harlan Hosp.
Ass'n., Inc., 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578,
165 N.E. 653 (1929); Wilder v. St. Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651
(1955); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 883 P.2d 250 (1963); Jervell v. Price, 246
N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140
(1934); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932); Murry v. Allen, 103
Vt. 878, 154 A. 678 (1931) ; Hawks v. De Hart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) ;
McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935); Reistad v. Manz, 11 Wis. 2d
155, 105 N.W.2d 324 (1960). But see 1D. LouisELL & L. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDi-
cAL MALPRAcricE CAsrs § 13.07 (1968 Supp.).
17. Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1960).
[O~n the other hand such a rule [discovery rule] does run counter to the
central idea behind statutes of limitation. They are statutes of repose de-
signed to promote stability in the affairs of men and avoid the uncer-
tainties and burdens inherent in defending against old claims. This being
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courts also reason that "statutes of limitations are favorites in the law and
cannot be avoided unless the party seeking to do so brings himself strictly
within some exception."' 8
These courts, however, apply a considerable number of such excep-
tions to the wrongful act rule. One is the "fraudulent concealment" ex-
ception, which treats a negligent act which is concealed by the defendant
as if it were a fraud. Such a characterization prevents the statute from
running until the wrong has been discovered. 19 Another exception, the
"continuing negligence" exception, treats the wrong as if it were recom-
mitted each time the doctor treats the patient and fails to find his pre-
viously committed wrong.2 0 This exception would postpone the running
of the statute until the termination of the physician-patient relationship.
(It has thus become the rule in some jurisdictions that the statute does not
begin to run in any case until the end of the relationship.2 1 ) The under-
lying theory of this rule is that the physician is guilty of malpractice dur-
ing the entire period of the relationship for not repairing the damage
done.22 Some jurisdictions draw a distinction between the termination
of treatment and the termination of the physician-patient relationship.2 3
These jurisdictions allow the limitation period to commence even though
the patient is still under the care of the negligent doctor, but only if treat-
ment relating to the negligence has been terminated. Missouri is sometimes
considered among these jurisdictions. 24
Missouri has a specific statute of limitation covering malpractice
cases,2 15 which supplants, as to those cases, other statutes which apply to
torts in general.28 Section 516.140 RSMo 1969 states:
All actions against physicians, surgeons.. for damages for mal-
practice.., shall be brought within two years from the date of the
act of neglect complained of . . . .27
so, there is good reason for concluding that the legislature should mark
out any departure from that basic purpose as it has done in the case of
actions grounded on fraud.
18. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954, 956 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966); Hunter v. Hunter, 361 Mo. 799, 806, 287 S.W.2d 100, 104 (1951);
Shelby County v. Bragg, 135 Mo. 291, 800, 36 S.W. 600, 602 (1896).
19. Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 868, 401 (1961).
20. Id. at 879.
21. Clinard v. Pennington, 488 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. 1968), rejects the dis-
covery rule in foreign object cases and holds that employment of another doctor
is an indication of termination of treatment.
22. De Long v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Bowers
v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 861, 124 N.E. 288 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St.
106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). But see Cook v. Yager, 18 Ohio App. 2d 1. 238 N.E.
826 (1968), which overrules the above Ohio cases and adopts a hybrid form of
the discovery rule under which the statute begins to run not upon discovery of
the negligence, but upon discovery of the injury.
28. 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 18.08 (1969).
24. See 80 A.L.R.2d 868, 879 (1961).
25. § 516.140, RSMo 1969.
26. §§ 516.100, .280, RSMo 1969.
27. § 516.140, RSMo 1969. (emphasis added).
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However, section 516.100, RSMo 1969 states:
Civil actions ... can only be commenced within the periods pre-
scribed in the following sections, after the causes of action shall
have accrued; provided, that for the purposes of sections 516.100 to
516.370, the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when
the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty
occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained
and is capable of ascertainment .... 28
The inconsistency between the malpractice statute, which indicates the
period of limitation starts to run on the date of the "act of neglect com-
plained of," and the general statute, which seems to adopt the discovery
rule, has caused some difficulty and confusion in Missouri regarding the
question of which statute controls.
The first Missouri case dealing with the problem was Thatcher v.
De Tar,2 9 which involved statutes identical to sections 516.100 and
516.140.30 The Missouri Supreme Court in that case held that the "act
of neglect complained of" was the subsequent treatment of symptoms
caused by the failure to discover a needle left in the plaintiff's body.
Thus the limitation period did not begin to run until the termination of
treatment, since that was the date of the last act of negligence. This
interpretation, although emphasizing the specific malpractice statute, trans-
ports the date of the beginning of the limitation period to the latest pos-
sible time still consistent with the specific statutory language. In 1956
the Missouri court reaffirmed the position taken in Thatcher, holding in
Rippe v. Sutter3 l that when the act, although causing physical injury, is
not legally injurious until certain consequences occur, the statute of lim-
itations will not begin to run until the date of the consequential "legal"
injury. This position was reaffirmed in National Credit Assn., Inc. v.
Tinker32 when the court concluded that the date of the act complained
of can mean only the date of the last treatment since that is the last act
of neglect.
Further confusion developed in 1968 when the court, in Laughlin v.
Forgrave,88 reviewed the legislative history of section 516.140 and de-
cided that it clearly showed a legislative intent to treat medical malprac-
tice with particularlity and to establish a specific date on which the statute
of limitations should begin to run.8 4 The court was of the opinion that
the specificity of section 516.140 was intended to create an exception to
the general provisions of section 516.100.35 The court stated that the spe-
cific malpractice statute should prevail over the general one, since the
specific provision was added as an amendment and thus appeared to be
an exception to, or qualification of, the general provision.3 6
28. § 516.100, RSMo 1969. (emphasis added).
29. 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
30. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1016, 1012 (1939).
31. 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956).
32. 401 S.W.2d 954 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
33. 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
34. Id. at 312.
35. Id. at 313.
36. Id. at 312.
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The Missouri Supreme Court in concurrent opinions in Kauchick v.
Williams3 7 and Smile v. Lawson3s held that section 516.280, RSMo 1969, s 9
which deals with improper acts that delay the commencement of an action,
was statutory authority for the proposition that fraudulent concealment
of a cause of action is an improper act which will toll the running of the
limitation period for malpractice actions provided in section 516.140.40
The Kauchick case requires that the physician must have had knowledge
of his own negligence and that he must have remained silent in order
for there to be fraudulent concealment within the purview of 516.280. The
court again noted that there was a long standing legislative policy of
treating separately limitations fixed by the general limitations statute and
those fixed by other statutes which concern specific causes of action such as
malpractice.41 When the legislature placed the malpractice statute of lim-
itations in the general limitations chapter instead of in sections relating
directly to doctors or malpractice, the court in Kauchick said it must be
charged with knowing of the distinction between general limitations statutes
and specific limitations statutes. This refuted the defendant's contention
that Section 516.300, RSMo, which says that exceptions and bars in the
general limitations article are not applicable to limitations periods cre-
ated by specific limitations statutes, 42 made section 516.280 inapplicable
to malpractice. It would therefore appear that the Missouri position is
that the statute of limitations begins to run upon termination of treat-
ment43 unless it is tolled by some fraudulent concealment by the physician.44
Provided knowledge by the doctor can be shown, silence is enough for
concealment. 45
Judge Finch concurred in the result in Smile v. Lawson48 but dis-
agreed with the majority opinion that silence and knowledge by the doctor
constituted fraudulent concealment which tolled the statute of limitations.
In his opinion, if silence tolled the statute of limitations by virtue of sec-
tion 516.280, this was actually a form of the discovery rule, conditioned
only upon the doctor's knowledge. If this observation is correct, the dis-
covery rule has been adopted de facto in Missouri. He pointed out, how-
ever, that the court had recently held that the legislature did not intend
to apply the discovery rule established in section 516.100 to malpractice
cases.
47
37. 435 S.W.2d. 342 (Mo. En Banc. 1968).
38. 435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. En Banc. 1968).
39. § 516.280, RSMo 1969, states:
If any person, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other
improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such action
may be commenced within the time limited, after the commencement of
such action shall have ceased to be so prevented.
40. Smile v. Lawson, 435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
41. Kauchick v. Williams, 435 P.W.2d 342, 346 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
42. § 516.300, RSMo 1969.
43. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
44. Smile v. Lawson, 435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
45. Kauchick v. Williams, 435 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
46. 435 S.W.2d 325, 330 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
47. As authority Judge Finch cited: Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308
(Mo. En Banc 1968); Yust v. Barnett, 432 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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Some writers have argued that Missouri has adopted the discovery
rule,4 8 while others advocate that it should be adopted.49 In any event, it
would be desirable for the legislature to clear up the confusion caused by
the two conflicting statutory provisions. Since it is patently unfair both
to deprive a plaintiff of his cause of action before he knows he has been
injured, and to subject doctors to the onerous burden of defending stale
claims, which is the effect of the Frohs decision, the desirable type of
statute is the type discussed above which adopts a double limitation period.
This type of statute extends the period for discovery without allowing the
plaintiff to sleep on his cause of action after he has discovered the injury.5 °
Such a statute would provide certainty in Missouri law. Also, it would
prevent any confusion caused in Oregon by the Frohs decision which was
handed down in the face of two rejections of an all inclusive discovery
rule by the legislature and the subsequent legislative adoption of a dis-
covery rule which is limited to foreign object cases."1
GERALD D. McBzm
THE EXTENT OF AN EMPLOYERS DUTY
TO RECOGNIZE UNION AUTHORIZATION CARDS
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.'
The cases of Gissel Packing Co.,2 Heck's, Inc.,3 General Steel Products,
Inc.,4 and Sinclair Co.5 were consolidated and certiorari granted by the
Supreme Court in order to ascertain the "extent of an employer's duty
under the National Labor Relations Act 6 to recognize a union that bases
its claim to representative status solely on the possession of union authoriza-
tion cards.. ." More specifically the Supreme Court had to decide whether
48. Cf., Comment, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1205 (1950).
49. McCleary, Malpractice-When Statute of Limitations Commences in Mal-
practice Actions, 9 Mo. L. REv. 102 (1944) ; Davis, Tort Liability and the Statute
of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REv. 171 (1968).
50. Statutes cited note 15 supra.
51. Because of the amendment of the Oregon statute (see note 2 supra),
Frohs may not have brought about the degree of certainty desired. Oregon now
has a statute which arguably limits the application of the discovery rule to foreign
objects cases, apparently in opposition to the Frohs decision which dearly adopts
the discovery rule in all types of cases.
1. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
2. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968).
3. NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
4. General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968).
5. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
6. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964),
was approved July 5, 1935. In 1947, it was amended by the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964). There were further amend-
ments made in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
7. 395 U.S. 575, 579, (1969).
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an employer's duty to bargain can arise without a Board election under
the National Labor Relations Act, whether union authorization cards are
a reliable enough indicator of employee desires to be a valid method for
determining a union's majority status, and whether a bargaining order by
the Board is the appropriate remedy when an 'employer both refuses to
bargain upon a union demand which is based on its possession of authoriza-
tion cards from a majority of the workers in the unit, and at the same time
commits unfair labor practices which make a fair election improbable.
All four cases presented essentially the same legal as well as factual
issues. The unions began a campaign to organize the employees of four
companies and obtained union authorization cards from a majority of these
employees. The union then demanded recognition from the employers,
using the authorization cards as a basis for their demand. The employers
refused, stating that the union authorization cards were inherently unreli-
able indicators of their employees' desires. Each employer then undertook
a vigorous antiunion campaign that led to the filing of several unfair
labor practice charges. The National Labor Relations Boards found in
each case that the employers had violated section 8(a)(1)9, having engaged
in restraint and coercion of their employees. Also, the Board found that
the employees were wrongfully discharged because of their union activity,
in violation of section 8(a)(3). 10 The Board further decided that the em-
ployers had rejected the demand of the unions to bargain, based on union
authorization cards, in "bad faith,"11 finding that the employers were not
motivated by "good faith" doubts as to the union's majority status but only
desired time in which to destroy the union's majority status. Therefore the
Board found that the employers had failed to recognize the unions in
8. The National Labor Relations Board was created by the Wagner Act of
1935 and amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The Board consists of five
members, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Each member
serves a five year term and the President appoints one of the members to serve
as Chairman of the Board. Section 8(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
Section 7 of the Act states that employees shall have the right to self-organization
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
10. Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act states that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hiring
or tenure of employment or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in labor unions.
In Gissel, two employees were told in no uncertain terms by the company vice-
president that if they were caught talking to union men, they would be fired. These
same employees were later discharged for having attended a union meeting.
In Heck's, leading union supporters were discharged shortly after having gotten
a majority of the employees to sign union authorization cards. Other employees
were interrogated as to their union activities and warned to withdraw their author-
ization.
11. Section 8(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 provides
that it is
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representatives of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment...
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violation of section 8(a)(5).j 2 In each case the Board ordered the employer
to cease and desist its unfair labor practices and ordered the companies
to bargain with the unions.
On appeal, in the Gissel, Heck's and General Steel cases, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sustained the Board's finding that there
were 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations.13 However, the Board's finding of an
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain was rejected, and the court refused to enforce
the Board's order directing the companies to bargain with the unions.' 4
However, in Sinclair Company the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
sustained all the Board's findings and enforced the bargaining order.' 5
Because of the conflict between the circuits16 over the effect to be given
union authorization cards, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 7
The employers contended in Gissel and the other cases that a union
can establish a bargaining obligation only by winning a Board election.
12. Section 8(a)(5) of The Labor Management Relations Act states that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
Section 9(a) states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ...
13. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 389 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d
339 (4th Cir. 1968).
14. The Fourth Circuit stated its position on authorization cards clearly when
the court stated in Heck's:
We have recently discussed the unreliability of the cards, in the usual
case, in determining whether or not a union has attained a majority status
and have concluded that an employer is justified in entertaining good
faith doubts if the union's claim when confronted with a demand for rec-
ognition based solely upon union authorization cards. We have also noted
that the National Labor Relations Act after the Taft-Hartley amendments
provides for an election as the sole basis of a certification and restricts the
Board to the use of secret ballot for the resolution of representation ques-
tions.
NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 1968). This was the Fourth Cir-
cuit's position even though it was conceded that the company had threatened em-
ployees, engaged in illegal interrogations, illegally offered benefits to employees,
and discharged employees because of their union activities.
See also NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson &: Co., 386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967), and
its companion case, NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
15. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1968).
16. Most of the circuit courts disavow the Fourth Circuit's position on au.
thorization cards, but to varying degrees. See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,
185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914, (1951); NLRB v. Gotham
Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Quality Markets, Inc.,
387 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Phil-Modes, Inc., 396 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.
1968); Atlas Engine Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1968), petition of
certiorari pending; NLR.B v. Clark Products, Inc., 385 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Ralph Printing &c Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1967); Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB 381
F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1967).
17. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 393 U.S. 997 (1968).
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They argued, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed,",
that the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 eliminated such alternate routes
to majority status as authorization cards. The most common method,19
and from the Board's point of view the preferred method,2 0 is a Board
election and certification under section 9(c).2 '
A union, however, is not limited to this method of establishing a bar-
gaining obligation. Section 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act states that "it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain
collectively with representatives of his employee subject to the provisions
of section 9(a)." 22 Section 9(a) states that "representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in such unit ...." In regard to this latter
section, the Supreme Court stated in Gissel that by using the words "des-
ignated" or "selected," Congress intended that there should be routes to
majority status other than Board conducted elections.23 Such a position
was first recognized by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Flooring Co.,2 4 in which the Court stated "[i]n the absence of
any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required majority of
eligible employees, the employer's denial of recognition of the union would
have violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act."2 5 Relying on the legislative history of
the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court
in Gissel stated that Congress never intended to eliminate a union's right
to establish a bargaining obligation by proving that they had a card-based
majority.2 6 In an earlier version of the bill, it was proposed that the Board
could find an 8(a)(5) only where an employer refused to bargain with a
union already recognized by the employer or one certified by a Board elec-
tion.27 This proposal, which would have resulted in the elimination of
authorization cards as an alternate route to bargaining status, was rejected
by Congress. 28
The employers' second contention in Gissel and the other consolidated
cases was that authorization cards are such "inherently unreliable indicators
18. See note 14, supra.
19. In 1967, the Board conducted 8116 elections under section 9(c) and issued
only 157 bargaining orders based on a majority obtained by authorization cards.
Levi Strauss, 172 NLRB No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1542 n. 9 (1968). See also J.
Sheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization Cards, 3 GA. L. Rv.
319 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077 (1967). Cf., General Shoe Corp.,
77 NLRB 124 (1948).
21. Section 9(c) of the Act establishes the proper procedures for a Board elec-
tion and proper certification procedures.
22. See note 12, supra.
23. 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969). Both the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947 used this terminology. The Taft-Hartley Act was never in-
tended to make the Board election the sole basis of a certification as the Fourth
Circuit contends.
24. 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
25. Id. at 69. See also NLRB v. Bradford Dying Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 339-40
(1940); Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
26. 395 U.S. 575, 598 (1969).
27. H.R. 8020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., § 8(a)(5) (1947).
28. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
[VOL 35
41
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
RECENT CASES
of employee's desires"29 that they should never be used to establish a bar-
gaining obligation. For this reason they asked the Supreme Court to elim-
inate the use of authorization cards, thus doing what Congress had refused
to do in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. The employers and the
Fourth Circuit presented two main objections to their use: (1) that card-
based representation is so inferior to the election procedure that it should
never be used;30 and (2) that the union authorization cards are in many
cases obtained from the employees through misrepresentation and coerdon.
The employers contended that union organizers in many cases mislead em-
ployees regarding the effect of signing authorization cards. The employees
are told or led to believe that the cards are being obtained in order to seek
an election to determine union representation, while in reality they are
being used to establish the union as the collective bargaining representative.
The Board and the Supreme Court have previously recognized the
superiority of the election procedure in most cases. 3 ' However, where an
employer engages in conduct that disrupts and thus prevents a fair elec-
tion, a bargaining obligation established by authorization cards may be
the only way to assure that employees are given a fair and free choice.
An objection that the card's purpose is often misrepresented and that
signing is often gained by coercion has also been rejected by the Court
because it viewed the Board's Cumberland Shoe Doctrine32 as adequate
assurance against such tactics by the union.33 The Cumberland Shoe Doc-
trine requires that the authorization card dearly and unambiguously state
on its face that the employee, by signing it, is authorizing the union to rep-
resent him in collective bargaining; the wording of the card must not lead
the employee to think that he is signing it solely for the purpose of ob-
taining an election. However, it should be noted that the Court in Gissel
found nothing inconsistent in a union's handing an employee a card stat-
ing its purpose dearly while at the same time telling the employee the
card probably will be used to obtain an election. This is because in the
vast majority of cases the signing of the cards does result in a Board elec-
tion.3 4
29. 393 U.S. 575, 601, (1969).
30. There is a comparison of the card procedure and the election process in
NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 564-566 (4th Cir. 1967).
31. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
32. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 NLRB 1268 (1964). The Board's approach
toward allegations of misrepresentation in the solicitation of authorization cards
was reaffirmed in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968).
33. The Court admits that there have been abuses in the use of authorization
cards, and that in several cases union organizers have misrepresented to employees
the effect of signing these cards. Note also that the Second Circuit (NLRB v. S. E.
Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967)) and the Fifth Circuit (Engineers & Fab-
ricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967)) have joined the Fourth Cir-
cuit in criticizing the Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine.
For scholarly criticism of the Board's policy on authorization cards see Com-
ment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966); Welles, The Obligation
to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. REv. 349 (1969); Browne,
Obligation to Bargain on Basis of Card Majority, 3 GA. L. REV. 334 (1969); and
Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis for an N.L.R.B. Order to
Bargain?, 47 Tux. L. REv. 87 (1968)'
34. The Board in Levi Strauss, 172 NLRB No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1341
n. 7 (1968) in explaining the Cumberland Shoe doctrine, issued a warning against
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Finally the Court in Gissel answered the question of whether a bargain-
ing order by the Board is the appropriate remedy. There have been three
phases in the Board's handling of the question of when it is proper to issue
an order to the employer to bargain based upon a card-based union major-
ity. The approach followed by the Board until 1966 was known as the
Joy Silk Doctrine.85 An employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with
a union which sought to gain representation through the use of authoriza-
tion cards, but his refusal must have been based on "good faith" doubts
as to the union's majority status. He could then insist that the union prove
it was a majority by winning an election. However, if the Board found an
absence of "good faith" doubts on the part of the employer, it could then
enter a bargaining order. Absence of "good faith" was usually found by the
Board if the employer had engaged in independent unfair labor practices
or if the employer could provide no reason why he had doubts as to the
card-based majority.3 6 In 1966, in Aaron Brothers,37 the Board modified
the Joy Silk Doctrine by requiring the Board to show "bad faith" rather
than the employer showing "good faith." The Board also stated that only
unfair labor practices tending to destroy the union's majority would show
"bad faith;" then and only then would the Board issue a bargaining order.
The Board's present approach, as argued before the Supreme Court in
Gissel, is quite similar to Aaron Brothers; i.e., an employer's "good faith"
doubts are unimportant. The employer need not recognize the purported
card-based majority and can insist on an election, either by filing an elec-
tion petition himself under section 9(c)(1)(B)38 or by having the union file
a mechanical application of the rule without looking at the totality of the circum-
stances. The Board stated:
Thus the fact that employees are told in the course of solicitation that an
election is contemplated, or that a purpose of the card is to make an
election possible, provides in our view insufficient basis in itself for vitiat-
ing unambiguously worded authorization cards on the theory of misrepre-
sentation. A different situation is presented, of course, where union organ-
izers solocit cards on the explicit or indirectly expressed representation that
they will use such cards only for an election and subsequently seek to use
them for a different purpose .....
The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepre-
sentation is confined to situations where employees are expressly told in
haec verba that the 'sole' or 'only' purpose of the cards is to obtain an
election. The Board has never suggested such a mechanistic applica-
tion of the foregoing principles, as some have contended. The Board
looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or non-use of
certain key or 'magic' words that is controlling, but whether or not the
totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation is such, as to
add up to an assurance to the card signer that his card will be used for no
purpose other than to help get an election.
8. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 85 NLRB 1263 (1949); enforced, 87 U.S.
App. D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 782 (1950).
36. See Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962).
37. Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077 (1966).
88. Section 9(c)(1)(B) was part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments and
provided that an employer could petition for a Board election whenever "one or
more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be rec-
ognized as the representative defined in section 9(a)."
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the petition. However, whether a bargaining order will issue will depend
on "the commission of serious unfair labor practices that interfere with
the election processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election."39
In essence the Board's approach as indicated by its action in Gissel
is to abandon the "good faith-bad faith" distinction which has caused much
criticism and controversy.40 The new standard for issuance of a bargaining
order is whether the employer's actions have had a substantial effect on
the holding of a fair election. The approach of the Board under both Joy
Silk and Aaron Brothers was concerned with the employer's subjective mo-
tivation at the time he rejected the cards. In Gissel the Board's emphasis
has been shifted to an examination of the nature and extent of the em-
ployer's post-bargaining-demand unfair labor practices and their effect on
employee rights. In Gissel the Supreme Court has approved of the Board's
approach to the issuance of a bargaining order but emphasized the Board's
qualification that this is not a per se rule that any employer unfair labor
practice will lead to a bargaining order. The Court pointed out that there
is a class of less extreme unfair labor practices which will not sustain a
bargaining order.
There are thus three ways that a union can establish a bargaining obli-
gation on the part of the employer: (1) under section 941 of the Act (formal
approach), which deals with the handling and processing of representa-
tion cases; (2) by employer-union agreement that the union, if it has a ma-
jority 6f the employees, 42 will be the bargaining representative of the em-
ployees (a consent election); 43 (3) through unfair labor practice proceedings
and an order to bargain directed by the Board (Gissel Packing Co. case).
The overwhelming majority of obligations to bargain are established on the
basis of a Board election or with the consent of the employer.44 Although
there has been much discussion and criticism over recognition of unions
through authorization cards, the problem comes up in less than two percent
of the cases.45
As indicated earlier, there can be no doubt that a Board election or
consent election is the preferred method of determining the employees'
desires; the courts, the Board, the employers, and the unions agree on this.
39. 393 U.S. 575, 594, (1969).
40. See Sheinkman, Recognition of Union Through Authorization Cards, 3
GA. L. REv. 319, 331 (1969); and Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable
Basis for an N.L.R.B. Order to Bargain?, 47 Tax. L. Ray. 87 (1968).
41. See note 21, supra.
42. An employer may not recognize a minority union. See International La-
dies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
43. Section 9(c)(4) provides that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of
hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity
with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
44. In Gordon, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to Bargain, 19
L.A.B.L.J. 201 (1968), it states that in a five-and-one-half year period from 1962
through 1967, there were over 40,000 Board elections and only 365 bargaining or-
ders. See also note 19 supra.
45. NLRB, Supplemental Memo to the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
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However, under certain circumstances an employer, by engaging in unfair
labor practices (8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) employer activities) may make a free
and fair election impossible. In this situation the authorization card route
to majority status is more reliable than an election, and an order to the
employer to bargain is the appropriate remedy. This is because the em-
ployer by his own acts has destroyed the preferred method of establishing
a bargaining obligation.
There are also situations in which the employer's conduct is not an
unfair labor practice, and so does not violate the Act, but is sufficiently
disruptive of the election so that the Board must set the election aside. The
Board then holds a "rerun" election. It has been argued by numerous au-
thorities that these successive "rerun" elections do not deter the employers
from future disruptive conduct, but that they do sap employee desire and
endanger their job security.46 Added to this is the fact that employer inter-
ference with the first election in most cases proves to be a successful tactic
because in most rerun elections the union loses.47 A good argument can be
made that in these cases a bargaining order based on the card majority is
necessary to prevent irreparable damage.48
PATICK E. MUPHY
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF ZONING ORDINANCES IN MISSOURI
Ewing v. City of Springfield1
Plaintiffs, owners of five contiguous tracts of land, instituted a de-
claratory judgment action to determine the validity of the zoning ordinance
of Springfield, Missouri as applied to their property. The Springfield Court
of Appeals held that the zoning classification of the subject property was
discriminatory, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Furthermore, the court found
that the classification had no substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, or general welfare, the question being beyond fair debate.
The Ewing decision does not change the existing law or forge ahead
into new areas; it is merely typical of zoning cases in general. It exhibits
those characteristics, obstacles to analysis, which are common to the de-
cisions in Missouri and most other jurisdictions. Despite these obstacles,
there are roughly identifiable criteria applied by the courts. 2 This casenote
will attempt to extract the criteria actually used by the Missouri courts in
determining whether a zoning ordinance has become so confiscatory as to
be unconstitutional as specifically applied to a particular parcel of land.
46. See generally Sheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization
Cards, 3 GA. L. REv. 319 (1969).
47. See Pollitt, N.L.R.B. Re-run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963).
48. See Sheinkman, Recognition of Union Through Authorization Cards, 3
GA. L. RFv. 319, 331 (1969).
1. 449 S.W.2d 681 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
2. See note 5 infra and accompanying text.
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The subject property is located on the south side of Sunshine Avenue.
It is bordered by Pickwick Avenue to the west and Glenstone Avenue to
the east. All the tracts were zoned R-3 (multi-family) to a depth of two
hundred feet with four of the tracts zoned partially single family and par-
tially two family beyond that depth.
To the south of the tracts is a residential area which abuts and is con-
tiguous to them. There is no regular or vehicular access to the tracts from
this residential area. To the east are a medical clinic and nineteen other par-
cels of land zoned C-2, which contemplates retail sales use. To the west of the
subject property are fifteen tracts also classified C-2 for a distance of 1800
feet. Sunshine Avenue carries the traffic of United States highways 60 and
65 and Missouri Highway 160. The volume of traffic passing the subject
property is increasing rapidly.
The plaintiffs sought to have the court declare the R-3 classification
of a portion of their tracts unconstitutional on the grounds that the or-
dinance as applied to their property was discriminatory, arbitrary and
capricious, and confiscatory. They also sought the court to declare that the
tracts should properly have been rezoned C-2.
The city argued that each element of the plaintiffs' constitutional at-
tack must be clearly demonstrated before the zoning ordinance could be
held invalid with respect to a particular parcel of land. The court rejected
this argument, saying each zoning case must be considered on its own
facts and that no single factor is controlling.
The court found that this particular zoning arrangement constituted
spot zoning,3 but since spot zoning is not necessarily invalid,4 the court
said that the circumstances of the case must be further considered. The fac-
tors considered were:
The use to which nearby property is put, and the authorized land
usage or zoning of nearby property; the hardship imposed on the
complaining landowner and the extent to which the value of his
property is diminished; the effect which removal of the restriction
would have on the value of other property in the area; and the
relative gain to the public as compared to the hardships imposed
on the property owner.5
Although the court noted that no single consideration was controlling, it
found all of them to be favorable to the plaintiffs' case and held that the
3. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AmmUcAN LAw OF ZONING § 5.04 (1968) for a discussion
of the various definitions of "spot zoning."
4. State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, 362 Mo. 242, 247, 240 S.W.2d 934,
937 (1951).
5. 449 S.W.2d at 689-90. This language comes from Robertson v. City of
Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604, 609 (D. Ore. 1961), where the court said that:[a]mong the factors bearing upon a decision are the following: the char-
acter of the neighborhood; traffic conditions on adjacent streets, the use
to which nearby property is put; the authorized land usage or zoning of
nearby property; the extent to which the value of the complaining land-
owner's property is diminished; the effect which removal of restrictions
would have on the value of other property in the area; and the relative
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R-3 zoning classification of the plaintiffs' tracts was discriminatory, arbi-
trary, unreasonable and confiscatory.6
Decisions dealing with a constitutional challenge to zoning ordinances
as applied to a particular parcel of land are vaguely written and given little
direction. A number of reasons have combined to create this unfortunate
circumstance. Since the United States Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the concept of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,7 it has abdicated the field.8 Thus there are no authoritative, uniform
guidelines for the constitutional problems involved. This would not be
critical except for the fact that state courts have been less than successful
in filling the void left by the Supreme Court.9
State courts simply have not written opinions which clearly articulate
the constitutional tests based on the due process clause, and the prohibition
against the confiscation of private property for public use without just
compensation. Often, the Missouri courts have said that the "constitutional
issue" amounts only to plaintiff's contention that the zoning ordinance has
been applied incorrectly to his property.' 0 The typical pattern of these de-
cisions is to review the factors considered relevant, then conclude that the
ordinance as applied to the subject property is, or is not, discriminatory,
arbitrary and capricious, and confiscatory. This failure by the state courts
may be rationalized to some extent, however, by the very nature of the
zoning case itself. The zoning case must be based on its own peculiar facts
and is, therefore, often of little value as precedent."
Whether the classification and enforcement of the ordinance is
reasonable and constitutional or wbether it is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and therefore unconstitutional depends upon a careful
examination of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of each
case.12
By way of introduction, it must be remembered that zoning is a legis-
lative act.'$ The authority for the enabling legislation is the state's in-
herent police power.' 4 Therefore, the court is not at liberty to substitute
6. The court also held that the ordinance was not invalid as applied to one
of the plaintiffs, Safety Federal Savings and Loan Association. Because Safety Fed-
eral bought the property knowing of its restricted use, constructed a building
conforming to that use, conducted its business with no intention of any other
use, and did not contend that the ordinance was unreasonable as applied to
itself, the court said it was estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance.
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. See 13 Williams, ZONING Dimcs 57 (1961).
9. See id. at 67.
10. See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Springfield, 449 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Spr. Mo. App.
1970); Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 844 (Mo. 1963); Wrig-
ley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 869 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. 1963); Landau v.
Levin, 358 Mo. 77, 81, 213 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1948).
11. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERCAN LAW or ZONING § 2.12 (1968>.
12. City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Memorial Post Benev-
olent Ass'n, 358 Mo. 70, 74, 213 S.W.2d 479, 480 (1948). See also Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 565, 388 (1926).
13. Urnstein v. Village of Town and Country, 368 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963).
14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); State ex
rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 817 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (En Bane
1927), error dismissed, 278 U.S. 662 (1928).
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its judgment for that of the legislature unless it appears that the ordinance
is arbitrary and unreasonable.' 5 And it must also be remembered that it
is only the exceptional situation in which the constitutional challenge is
successful.
Although it is not clear whether the cases are based on state or federal
constitutional grounds,1 6 constitutional principles form the outer limits
of the state's police power. Moreover, the state may regulate only to the
point at which there is still a substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. 17 Past this point the individual's con-
stitutional rights protect him from further encroachments. Thus an in-
dividual property owner's rights are not subject to restrictions "that are
not directed towards a proper community purpose.' 8 It is unfair to place
great burdens upon the individual merely to retain zoning restrictions of
relatively little benefit to the community.' 9 The equal protection clause
operates to provide individuals and groups with equal access to the uses
of their property and to guard against "loose or discriminatory administra-
tion of the power to grant variances or special permits.1 20
Basically, the relevant criteria used in determining constitutionality
are those considered by the court in Ewing.21 Although the court listed the
balancing of interests as the last of the factors to be considered, this test
should be thought of as the framework within which the other factors are
considered.2 2 The public benefit which the ordinance is intended to confer
is balanced against the hardship placed upon the individual property owner.
If the balance is with the public or if the issue is fairly debatable, then the
ordinance must be upheld.23
The first factor considered relevant by the Missouri courts is the basic
character of the neighborhood and whether the classification of the subject
property is consistent with the authorized uses of nearby property.2 4 Thus
15. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Allega v.
Associated Theatres, Inc., 295 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).
16. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926), the
United States Supreme Court said:
The question is the same under both Constitutions (U.S. and Ohio),
namely, as stated by appellee: Is the ordinance invalid in that it violates
the constitutional protection 'to the right of property in the appellee by
attempted regulations under the guise of the police power, which are
unreasonable and confiscatory?'
Apparently, since this statement was made, no state court has bothered to specify
under which constitution, state or federal, the violation occurred.
17. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Huttig v. City of Richmond
Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Mo. 1963).
18. See 13 Williams, ZONING DIGs 58 (1961).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See note 5 supra, and accompanying text. It should be noted that within
the basic framework of the balancing of interests test, the various criteria overlap.
22. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Mo. 1963).
23. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Lan-
dau v. Levin, 358 Mo. 77, 82, 213 S.W.2d 483, 485 (1948). Although the burden
of persuasion is beyond fair debate, there is a tendency by the courts to resolve
debate short of that point. 1 R. Anderson, Aimluc.N LAw OF ZONING § 2.19 (1968).
24. Ewing v. City of Springfield, 449 S.W.2d 681 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
1970]
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an ordinance restricting land to residential use in a residential area is a valid
exercise of the police power.2 5 Furthermore, the fact that "the ordinance
establishes here and there small commercial districts... does not make it ir-
rational or discriminatory." 26 Accordingly, the Springfield ordinance is not
necessarily invalid as applied to the plaintiffs' tracts merely because neigh-
boring or adjacent land is less restricted. 27
A different result might obtain, however, where the basic character of
the neighborhood is considered commercial. Ewing is such a case. The court
found that the permitted residential use was inconsistent with the nearly
total commercial complexion of the neighborhood. 28 The court may find
the ordinance unreasonable where adjacent or nearby uses make the land
unsuitable for residential use.2 9 This result may be found even when the
nearby land is in another municipality.3 0
A second criterion used by the court in balancing public and private
interests is the extent to which the restriction works a hardship on the in-
dividual property owner. "The effect of a regulation which prevents all ef-
fective use is a confiscation." 31 Such a regulation is dearly more than a
"temporary and reasonable restriction placed upon the land to promote the
general welfare."3 2 An important distinction in the type of hardship or loss
to the property owner should be made. The potential loss due to refusal to
rezone 8 the land for a use for which the property has a greater value is
not as significant a factor as the loss to the existing value if the classifica-
tion is maintained.3 4 Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a
residential classification under which the land had an existing value of
$50,000 even though the value of the proposed commercal use was
$450,000.35 Nevertheless, as the court found in Ewing, there must be an
appreciable loss of value for the ordinance to be held arbitrary and un-
reasonable.30 A refusal to rezone which results in a loss through deprecia-
tion or prevents sale at a profit is not a controlling factor37
25. Urnstein v. Village of Town and Country, 368 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Mo.
1963).
26. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 1195, 298
S.W. 720, 726 (En Banc 1927), error dismissed, 278 U.S. 662 (1928).
27. Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 625 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
28. 449 S.W.2d 681, 690.
29. See Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo.
1963) where the court discussed the relevant cases.
30. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
31. Id. at 842.
32. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 233, 15 N.E.2d
587, 592 (1938).
33. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in zoning
cases. The property owner requesting a rezoning of his property must go through
the administrative hierarchy before he can seek relief in the courts. However, in
court, the basis of his suit is the constitutional challenge to the ordinance and
not the city's refusal to rezone.
34. Both of these factors, however, will be examined by the court.
35. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963).
36. 449 S.W.2d 681, 690.
37. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963);
Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771(En Banc 1952).
[Vol. 8,5
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A regulation is not unreasonable, therefore, merely because a landowner
is not able to put his land to the highest and best use or to use his land
for a specific desired purpose.38 Accordingly the hardship imposed upon a
landowner by a refusal to rezone his property, located near the Kansas City
municipal sports stadium, for use as a parking lot in an area zoned for
lodging and boarding houses, clubs, schools, fraternal orders, clinics, and
offices for physicians and surgeons was held not unreasonable.8 9 Likewise,
the economic hardship suffered by a landowner because of a refusal to re-
zone his tract for one acre minimum area family residential use where the
permitted use was three acre minimum lots was held to be not unreason-
able.40
The effect of removal of the zoning restriction on the value of the
other property in the area is another of the criteria in the basic framework.
The Ewing court felt that commercial zoning of the property would produce
no harmful effect on the residential property in the area.41 Some readjust-
ment of values is usually an incident of any zoning ordinance, 42 but where
the reclassification of the property would work to the detriment of the sur-
rounding area, refusal to rezone would be justified.43 The reasonableness
of a particular classification depends upon the requirements of the locality
and "what would be reasonable one place might well be unreasonable in
another."44 Thus the court refused to rezone a tract as one acre single
family residential in an area of three and five acre tracts because of the
detrimental effect to the surrounding area. 45
The Missouri courts have also viewed the effect of removal of the re-
striction from a broader perspective. A zoning classification may be upheld
in situations in which it would otherwise be overturned were it not for the
fact that it is part of and in the furtherance of a general plan designed to
foster the ends of health, safety, morals, or general welfare although the re-
striction itself has no immediate relation to the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. 46 The St. Louis Court of Appeals has observed that such
a comprehensive ordinance and its enforcement has a direct beneficial ef-
fect on the development values in certain areas.4T Thus viewed, a refusal to
rezone, far from merely suppressing offensive uses, operates, in some situa-
tions, to promote the general welfare. 48 This attitude is not inconsistent
with the court's liberal attitude in overturning zoning restrictions in metro-
38. Downing v. City of Joplin, 312 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Mo. 1958).
39. Gould v. Kansas City, 316 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1958).
40. Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246
S.W.2d 771 (En Banc 1952).
41. 449 S.W.2d 681, 690.
42. Strandberg v. Kansas City, 415 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
43. Gould v. Kansas City, 316 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1958).
44. Geneva Investment Co. v. City of St. Louis, 87 F.2d 83, 91 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 692 (1937).
45. Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246
S.W.2d 771 (En Banc 1952).
46. Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc'y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593(8th Cir. 1932).
47. Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 622 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
48. Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1042,
246 S.W.2d 771, 780 (En Banc 1952).
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politan areas.49 Taken together, the court is more likely to uphold a zon-
ing restriction on the ground that it is part of a comprehensive zoning
plan designed to promote the general welfare in a residential area.
This proposition is supported by the suggestion that in considering
the effect of the removal of the restriction the court looks at an element of
intent on the part of the community. The courts seem to have given this
factor considerable weight in three reported cases50 involving Ladue,51
a city described as "essentially one of fine homes and excellent schools and
churches." 52 The St. Louis Court of Appeals recognized that the enforce-
ment of Ladue's zoning ordinance has been responsible for the city's de-
velopment and high property values.53 It is the intent of the community, if
indeed a community may demonstrate its intent, to remain almost totally
residential. On the other hand, in invalidating an ordinance of the City of
Richmond Heights, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that
the refusal to rezone this property is based primarily upon a desire
to benefit (or conversely to refrain from possible injury to) the
subdivision of Lake Forest, and that it does not constitute a matter
of substantial city-wide interest.5 4
Further, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "a lawful and
ordinary use of property is not to be prohibited because repugnant to the
sentiments of a particular class." 55
The effect of the zoning classification on traffic conditions is another
relevant factor. Where existing traffic conditions have made the land un-
suitable for residential use, an ordinance restricting the land to that use may
be confiscatory. 50 Such a condition combined with incompatible uses would
49. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 572 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Mo. 1963).
The Missouri Supreme Court said:
The Illinois courts seem to have been rather liberal in overturning zoning
ordinances when considering their applicability to particular properties in
the metropolitan districts. We are interested in these outside cases only
to the extent that they may (and do in some instances) logically apply
rules similar to ours to given and similar factual situations. Actually,
the rules announced by the Illinois courts are almost identical to ours.
This liberal attitude of overturning zoning restrictions in metropolitan areas
and the court's inclination to enforce comprehensive plans in certain situations
are not all inconsistent. Obviously, they are not both applied in the same case.
It depends on the facts of the particular case which attitude will naturally apply
to those facts.
50. Wrigley Properties, Inc., v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963);
Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); Flora Realty
and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (En Banc
1952).
51. The City of Ladue is located directly west of St. Louis City in Saint
Louis County. In 1956, Ladue had a total area of 5000 acres of which 15.22 acres
were zoned for commercial use. It is almost totally single family residential.
52. Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 618 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
53. Id. at 622.
54. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 872 S.W.2d 83, 842 (Mo. 1963).
55. Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Soc'y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 598, 608(8th Cir. 1982).
56. Franz v. Village of Morton Grove, 28 I1. 2d 246, 190 N.E.2d 790 (196);
Rockdale Construction Corp. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 94 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1949), afJd
275 App. Div. 1043, 91 N.Y.S.2d 926, afd 801 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76 (1950).
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amount to a confiscation. 57 In Ewing, the court drew a distinction between
the amount of traffic which would be generated by a zoning change and
that which may be characterized as through traffic.58 The amount generated
by the change is. the more important factor.59 Thus, in light of the heavy
through traffic on Sunshine Avenue the court found that the relative in-
crease in the amount of traffic which a rezoning would generate to be
"relatively insignificant."60 On the other hand, a refusal to rezone from
three acre minimum tracts to one acre minimum tracts was upheld, in part,
because the potential increase in traffic would congest the small country
roads leading to the area.61
Although these criteria are discernible from the opinions of the courts,
their basis in law is still unclear. It is suggested that the Missouri courts have
a fairly unique opportunity in this field because of the abdication of the
United States Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court should de-













57. Del Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 148 Conn. 678, 124 A.2d 915
(1956); Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. 402, 149 A. 639 (1930).
58. 449 S.W.2d 681, 691.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246
S.W.2d 771 (En Banc 1952).
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